Remuneration Information • Mar 14, 2025
Remuneration Information
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1 REMUNERATION REPORT 2025




| LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NOMINATION AND REMUNERATION COMMITTEE | 06 |
|---|---|
| INTRODUCTION | 09 |
| 1 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 12 |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | PURPOSE, GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DURATION OF THE REMUNERATION POLICY | 20 |
| 3 | THE GOVERNANCE OF THE REMUNERATION PROCESS | 21 |
| 4 | REMUNERATION OF CHAIRMAN/CEO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND MSRs | 24 |
| 5 | NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION | 37 |
| 6 | REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF AUDITORS | 37 |
| 7 | DEROGATIONS | 38 |
| 1 | INTRODUCTION | 42 |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | PAY MIX | 43 |
| 3 | ACHIEVEMENT OF VARIABILE INCENTIVE SYSTEM | 43 |
| 4 | NON EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS | 48 |
| 5 | BOARD OF STATUTORY AUDITORS | 48 |
| 6 | CHANGE IN THE REMUNERATION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL BODY, THE GROUP'S RESULTS AND THE AVERAGE REMUNERATION OF GROUP EMPLOYEES |
49 |


Dear Shareholders,
it is with satisfaction that I present to you, as Chairman of Moncler's Nomination and Remuneration Committee, on behalf of the Board of Directors, the report on the policy regarding remuneration for 2025 and compensation paid in 2024.
In the year that just ended, the global landscape continued to be characterized by geopolitical tensions and market volatility: in a particularly uncertain and complex macroeconomic environment, whose impact on the Luxury sector has been markedly felt internationally, Moncler remained focused on its long-term-oriented strategy, which enabled the Group to achieve its growth targets. This not only demonstrates great resilience from the Group, but also makes the results achieved even more valuable to all stakeholders.
Credit for this achievement must be given to Top Management and all the people in the Moncler Group. The Group's ability to attract, retain and motivate the best resources continues to be of primary importance. For this reason, the principles of meritocracy and competitiveness, which inspire Moncler's remuneration policy, continue steadfastly to cultivate talent and support the achievement of medium- to long-term results that create sustainable value.
Therefore, with a view to continuous integration of national and international market best practices, while also taking into account the indications received as part of the intensive engagement activity that has been held with Investors and Proxy Advisors, the Company's new remuneration policy, which presents some changes and important elements of improvement, has been prepared.
The policy we are therefore submitting for your approval, first of all, has gone back again to having an annual duration and has also undergone simplification in its structure in order to make its assessment easier. Said simplification emerges, among others, in the representation of the MBO performance curve, the ranges applicable to its KPIs as well as in the illustration of the pay mixes; the peer group for benchmarking the remuneration of the Chairman/CEO has also been updated in order to compare it with an updated panel of companies more consistent with the industry Moncler belongs to and to which it refers; in addition, the cases in which the derogations can be applied to have been further limited. That said, the guiding principles remain the same as ever: the 2025 policy pursues the goal of valuing talent, recognizing goal achievement and value creation, aligning Top Management remuneration with the Company's sustainability strategy, and constantly monitoring best market practices.
The 2025 policy does not provide for a new share-based incentive plan, since such plans are proposed and adopted every two years (the last adopted plan was the one approved last year).
In the Section dedicated to the implementation of the remuneration policy (and thus to the compensation paid in 2024), the link between performance and short-term (MBO 2024) and medium-to-long-term (Performance Shares Plan 2022, Cycle I) remuneration is precisely illustrated.
Finally, as the three-year term of office draws to a close, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the members of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, Alessandra Gritti and Marco De Benedetti, for the valuable and tireless work carried out.
I would also like to conclude by thanking all of you Shareholders for your interest each year and I trust that you will find in this document comprehensive and useful information to continue to provide your positive support during the works of the Shareholders' Meeting.

DIVA MORIANI Chairman of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee


The Report is submitted to the Shareholders' vote pursuant to Article 123ter of the Consolidated Law on Finance and consists of two Sections:
The 2025 Policy was established in substantial continuity from the previous year, taking into consideration the feedback gathered from the engagement process with Proxy Advisors and Investors. However, certain changes have been made that respond to the need for continuous alignment with stakeholder expectations and market best practices and concern:
objectives of the MBO (short-term variable incentive) system;
Additionally, with regard to the Report:


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PURPOSE, GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DURATION OF THE REMUNERATION POLICY THE GOVERNANCE OF THE REMUNERATION PROCESS REMUNERATION OF CHAIRMAN/CEO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND MSRs NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF AUDITORS DEROGATIONS
Determined according to the role and delegated powers, ensuring competitiveness with respect to the market and internal equity.
Annual monetary incentive based on Group objectives. There is a cap (equal to 150% of the fixed component).
Chairman/CEO and Executive Directors 55% Group Ebit 30% Group Free Cash Flow 10% Group 5% Group People Engagement
Objectives declined based on the structure provided for Executive Directors, in relation to assigned responsibilities.
Share-based incentive related to medium to long-term Group goals represented by the 2024 Performance Shares Plan.
70% Group Net Income 15% Group Free Cash Flow 15% Group ESG
VESTING PERIOD: three years.
INCENTIVE ACCRUAL: Achievement of the performance objectives on a cumulative basis at the end of the vesting period.
They include company cars, life insurance, retirement plans and prevention programs.
No change.
policy.
Specific circumstances determining entitlement and criteria for setting the amount are provided. The total amount including any non-competition agreements does not exceed 2 years of fixed and variable remuneration (the latter calculated as the average of the last 3 MBOs paid).
No change.
No changes. Adjusted salary levels of a MSR.
Simplified performance curve, fully linear, possibility of differentiated performance ranges by objective.
No change: the 2024 Performance Shares Plan (along with the 2022 Performance Shares Plan) were included in the previous
A new LTI plan will be submitted to the Shareholders' Meeting for approval in 2026.
Claw back and malus mechanisms are to be applied to the short and medium- to long-term variable components

Chairman/CEO: € 1,500,000 Chief Business Strategy & Global Market Officer: € 1,198,000 Chief Corporate & Supply Officer: € 940,000 MSR: € 579,000 (average remuneration)
(amounts as a % of fixed remuneration) Chairman/CEO: 67% (target) – 143% (max) Chief Business Strategy & Global Market Officer: 50% (target) – 107% (max) Chief Corporate & Supply Officer: 49% (target) – 105% (max) MSR: 44% (target) – 91% (max)
(amounts as a % of fixed remuneration) Chairman/CEO: 168% (target) – 202% (max) Chief Business Strategy & Global Market Officer: 134% (target) – 160% (max) Chief Corporate & Supply Officer: 167% (target) – 200% (max) MSR: 169% (target) – 202% (max)
The payout is determined on the basis of achievement levels (threshold, target, maximum) with linear progression between levels
| Threshold | Target | Maximum | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Level of achievement |
-5/-2% vs target | Budget of fiscal year |
+7/+10% vs target |
| Payout | 50% | 100% | 150% |
The payout is calculated as for the financial objectives, but limited at target level
| Threshold | Target | target EBIT level. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Level of achievement |
50% | 100% | achievement |
| Payout | 50% | 100% | Payout |
Multiplier the final bonus may be increased up to 150% based on the Group's EBIT performance, being triggered from 101% of the
| Level of achievement |
101% | → | 107% | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Payout | 107% | → | 150% |
Payout 0% for results below the threshold level.
Cap of 150% for results above the maximum level Intermediate results are calculated by linear interpolation.
There are differentiated performance ranges per KPI.
The objectives (Net Income, Free Cash Flow and ESG are measured on objectives defined ex ante with a minimum, target and maximum threshold; the payout is proportional to the level of achievement and ranges from 80% to 120%.
| Threshold | Target | Maximum | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Economic and financial objectives |
-10% vs target | Cumulated Target | +5% vs target |
| Payout | 80% | 100% | 120% |
For the ESG objective, payout levels are determined with respect to the achievement of 3 objectives and a high rating (operating as over-performance) by one of the leading ESG rating companies in all three consecutive years.
Payout 0% for results below the threshold level.
Cap of 120% for results above the maximum level.
Intermediate results are calculated by linear interpolation.

The Remuneration Policy supports the achievement of the objectives defined in Moncler's Business Plan and is characterized by the following.
| Soundness of economic and financial performance |
The profitability of the business is at the heart of the short- and medium- to long term incentive systems, with focus on EBIT and Free Cash Flow, and make the variable component strongly linked to the Pay for performance principle. |
|---|---|
| Sustainability | • ESG issues are at the heart of the Group's strategy and are declined in the Strategic Sustainability Plan 2020-2025. • ESG objectives account for 10% of the MBO component and 15% of the LTI component. |
| Shareholders' medium- to long term interests |
The variable portion represents a significant component of the remuneration package of the CEO and other recipients of the Policy: the medium- to long-term component (LTI) is paid in Shares to ensure alignment with the medium- to long-term interests of Shareholders and stakeholders in general. |
| Remuneration of the generality of employees |
The principles of the incentive system in the Policy apply to all the employees, as the MBO and LTI systems are governed by the same regulations. |

The graphs below illustrate the pay mix for Executive Directors and MSRs (average figure).
The variable component accounts for more than 70% of the total and more than 2/3 of it is paid in Shares1 , subject to lock-up restrictions.
| Target | Max | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ABS | MBO | LTI | ABS | MBO | LTI | ||||||
| 30% | 1.5€m | 20% | 1€m | 50% | 2.5€m | 23% | 1.5€m | 32% | 2.1€m | 45% | 3€m |
| FIXED 30% | VARIABLE 70% | FIXED 23% | VARIABLE 77% |
| Target | Max | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ABS | MBO | LTI | ABS | MBO | LTI | |||||
| 35% | 1.2€m | 18% 0.6€m |
47% | 1.6€m | 27% | 1.2€m | 29% | 1.3€m | 44% | 1.9€m |
| FIXED 35% | VARIABLE 65% | FIXED 27% | VARIABLE 73% |
| ABS | MBO | LTI | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 32% | 1€m | 15% 0,5€m |
53% | 1.6€m |
| FIXED 32% | VARIABLE 68% |
| ABS 32% |
0.6€m | MBO 14% 0.3€m |
LTI 54% |
1€m |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FIXED 32% | VARIABLE 68% |
| ABS | MBO | LTI | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25% | 1€m | 26% | 1€m | 49% | 1.9€m |
| FIXED 25% | VARIABLE 75% |
| ABS | MBO | LTI | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26% | 0.6€m | 24% | 0.5€m | 50% | 1.1€m |
| FIXED 26% | VARIABLE 74% |
1 The mid- to long-term component is annualized taking into account the two-year assignment frequency. For the CEO, the value assigned every two years and amounting to Euro 6.3 million is annualized by considering two assignment cycles over 5 years: 6.3*2 / 5 = 2.5.
Institutional investors

The previous policy was approved by the Shareholders' Meeting in April 2022 and had a three-year term; therefore, it applied until Fiscal Year 2024 and was not submitted to the Shareholders' Meeting vote in 2023 and 2024.
Voting results on previous policies (2020 and 2022) are shown below.
Total shareholders


In 2024, only Section II of the report on compensation paid in 2023 was submitted to the Shareholders' Meeting for a vote. The report received the vote of a qualified majority among the Shareholders who approved the document with more than 75% of the voting capital.


The previous policy (2022-2024) included, as a medium- to long-term component, two LTI plans: the 2022 Plan and the 2024 Plan.

Institutional investors (% voting institutional investors)
88.1
41.4
57.2
61.1
37.8
Also in 2024, the Company, together with the Chairman of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, the Lead Independent Director and the Secretary of the Board of Directors, fueled a constructive dialogue with Proxy Advisors and Investors concerning, inter alia, the previous policy. Specifically, 15 meetings were held in 2024 (14 in preparation for the Shareholders' Meeting of 24 April 2024 and 1 thereafter) during which the elements which make up Moncler's remuneration system were analyzed and commented as well as aspects of the policy and/or report on which critical issues were highlighted by Proxy Advisors; representatives of the Investor Relations & Strategic Planning and Sustainability Functions also participated to these meetings.
The feedback and recommendations that emerged from the dialogue, as well as the outcomes of the Shareholders' votes in 2024, were reviewed and assessed during the Nomination and Remuneration Committee meetings for the purpose of preparing the new Policy.
Engagement activities clearly continue also in 2025 and, in view of the upcoming Shareholders' meeting, will be an important opportunity to illustrate the main innovations and improvements that characterize the new Policy; at the same time, the indications that will be gathered following the Shareholders' meeting will be considered, in order to incorporate any cues for potential development.
In view of the upcoming 16 April 2025 Shareholders' Meeting 15 meetings have been planned. As of the date of the Report, a meeting has already been held with one of the main Proxy Advisors, during which the latter shared its considerations also on remuneration.
To date, the Company has been able to clarify certain elements of the remuneration structure on which the Proxy Advisors, when recommending a vote, have in the past expressed some potential issues:

The Policy is based on the following principles, which are generally applicable to all the employees.
| Meritocracy | Rewarding employees based on their performance and achievements, thus incentivizing excellence and commitment. |
|---|---|
| Competitiveness | Offer market-competitive compensation packages to attract and retain top talent. |
| Equity | Ensure that all employees are paid fairly, without discrimination based on gender, age, ethnicity or other personal characteristics. |
| Equal opportunities | Ensure that all employees have equal opportunities for professional growth and development. |
| Sustainability | Integrate ESG objectives into variable compensation components, incentivizing responsible behaviors. |
| Transparency | Clearly communicate the criteria and processes for determining remuneration so that employees understand how they are evaluated and remunerated. |
The Group carefully monitors pay levels in order to avoid any form of gender gap: by means of the analyses conducted using the EDGE methodology, only marginal unexplained pay gaps2 within 5% emerge.
The policy for the generality of employees is characterized as follows.
2 That is the wage difference between men and women that cannot be explained by measurable factors such as work experience, level of specialization, type of occupation or hours worked.

The Remuneration Policy aims to attract, retain and motivate key people, in line with the Group's culture and values. This is done through a transparent and concrete link between variable compensation and the actually achieved performance, according to a "No pay for failure" dynamic.
The elements that characterize the Remuneration Policy support the achievement of the Group's strategic guidelines and are functional to the pursuit of the Company's sustainable.
| BALANCE BETWEEN FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS |
The variable component is adequately balanced against the fixed component, and is structured consistently with the Company's strategic objectives and risk profile. It represents the most significant part of total remuneration. |
|---|---|
| PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES |
They are predetermined, measurable, include ESG objectives, and are linked to a short-term (MBO) and medium- to long-term (LTI) horizon. |
| MAXIMUM LIMIT | The MBO includes a maximum cap, equal to 150% of the fixed component of the compensation package beyond which no additional incentive can be paid (even if performance exceeds the maximum range defined by the system). The LTI provides, in the event of results higher than the maximum level (over performance), a maximum payout equal to 120% of the target incentive. |
| TIME DEFERRAL (LTI LOCK-UP) |
A portion of the medium- to long-term component is subject to a lock-up restriction. |
| CLAW BACK AND MALUS CLAUSES |
It is envisaged that the Company may request the return of variable components already paid or withhold deferred amounts in case of misinformation, fraudulent behavior, or other specific individual circumstances. |
| SEVERANCE PAY | If provided, it is clear and predetermined, with a maximum limit of 2 years of fixed and variable remuneration (calculated as the average of the last 3 MBOs); it is not paid in case of inadequate performance. |
Starting from the current Fiscal Year, the 2025 Policy shall have an annual duration and, therefore, shall apply until the approval of the financial statements as of 31 December 2025.

The Policy is discussed by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, approved by the Board of Directors, and lastly submitted to the Shareholders' Meeting.
The bodies and parties involved in the definition and approval of the Policy are as follows.
| SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING |
The Shareholders' Meeting: • determines the remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors and the Board of Statutory Auditors, upon appointment and for the entire term of office; • resolves, upon the proposal of the Board of Directors, on share-based remuneration plans; • casts a binding vote on Section I of the Remuneration Report and an advisory vote on Section II. |
|---|---|
| BOARD OF DIRECTORS |
The Board: • determines, upon the proposal of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee and after hearing the opinion of the Board of Statutory Auditors, the remuneration of Executive Directors; • develops, with the assistance of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, the policy for the remuneration of Directors,MSRs and direct reports of the Chairman/CEO; • defines the objectives of variable remuneration and verifies the level of the objectives' achievement; • implements the share-based remuneration plans approved by the Shareholders' Meeting; • approves the policy to be presented to the Shareholders' Meeting; • assesses, with the support of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, the content of the vote on the remuneration report cast by the Shareholders' Meeting so that the relevant functions and bodies may discuss it in the post-Shareholders' Meeting engagement activity. |
| NOMINATION AND REMUNERATION |
The Committee performs inquiry, propositional and advisory functions to the Board of Directors on remuneration matters. Please refer to Section 3.2. |
| BOARD OF STATUTORY AUDITORS |
The Board of Statutory Auditors expresses the opinions required by current regulations with reference, in particular, to the remuneration of Executive Directors. |
| INTERNAL FUNCTIONS |
• People & Organization: ensures technical support for the definition (and subsequent implementation) of the remuneration policy; is guarantor of the remuneration systems, of the analysis of remuneration levels, of the performance management processes and of the succession planning, if any; • Finance: provides assistance at all stages of the policy- making process (from the determination of financial KPIs to the verifications of the achievement of related objectives); • Corporate Affairs & Compliance: provides support for the purposes of checks on the consistency of the policy with legal and regulatory provisions, also taking into account best practices and coordinates, along with the Chair of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee and the Sustainability Function, the engagement activity with the Proxy Advisors and Institutional Investors; • Sustainability: provides technical support for the definition of ESG objectives and their reporting. |
Market analyses on benchmark peers are conducted with the help of independent external consultants (for the 2025 Policy, Willis Towers Watson) who provide analysis with respect to remuneration practices and levels to monitor the adequacy of Top Management compensation. Please refer to Section 4.2 of the Report

Moncler's Nomination and Remuneration Committee is composed of Non-Executive Directors who are for the most part independent. All members have adequate knowledge and experience in financial and compensation policy matters. The Committee in office at the date of the Report was appointed by the Board on 21 April 2022 and will remain in office until the approval of the financial statements for the Fiscal Year with the following composition:
Diva Moriani Non-Executive and Independent Director - Chair Marco De Benedetti Non-Executive Director Alessandra Gritti Non-Executive and Independent Director
The Committee performs propositional and advisory functions for the Board of Directors. In particular, it formulates proposals on the remuneration of Directors, MSRs and direct reports of the Chairman/CEO, sets and verifies the performance objectives on which the variable component is based on, monitors the implementation of the Board's decisions on remuneration, reviews the remuneration policy report, periodically assesses the adequacy of the adopted policy, provides opinions on appointments, and oversees the self-assessment process of the Board and Committees.
During the Fiscal Year, the Committee held 6 meetings, with an average duration of 2 hours. The main activities that the Committee undertook during the Fiscal Year are represented below.
| 2024 | ACTIVITIES | |
|---|---|---|
| JANUARY MARCH |
• Preparation and review of the 2023 Remuneration Report • Definition of the 2024 Plan and related objectives • Analysis of engagement activity with a Proxy Advisor • Remuneration benchmarking analysis • Review of the outcomes of the self-assessment process of the Board of Directors and Board Committees • Verification of the achievement of objectives related to the 2023 MBOs and the second award cycle (2021-2023) of the 2020 Plan • Definition of the 2024 MBOs • Examination of the proposed salary review of a Manager with Strategic Responsabilities |
|
| APRIL JUNE |
• Implementation of the 2024 Plan • Analysis of engagement activities ahead of the 2024 AGM and voting analysis |
|
| JULY SEPTEMBER |
• Report to the Board of Directors on the activity carried out by the Committee in the first half of 2024 |
|
| OCTOBER DECEMBER |
• Policy Definition and preliminary examination of the Report • Examination of Board and Committee self-assessment questionnaire • Preliminary analysis of Chairman/CEO compensation benchmarking |
As of the date of approval of the Report, 2 meetings of the Committee have already been held, covering, among others, (i) the outcomes of the benchmarking activity that also covered the Executive Directors, MSRs and direct report of the Chairman/CEO; (ii) two proposed salary reviews of MSRs and of a direct report of the Chairman/CEO; (iii) the 2025 Policy and this Report; (iv) the verification of the achievement of the performance objectives of the MBO 2024 and 2022 Plan (Cycle I); (v) the outcomes of the Board Review process, the Diversity Policy and the Guidelines to Shareholders' (in light of the Board renewal).

The remuneration system adopted by Moncler and set forth in the Policy is structured as follows.
It is determined based on the role and assigned responsibilities, considering market remuneration levels for comparable roles.
It consists of a short-term cash component (MBO) and a medium- to long-term share component (LTI).
Performance objectives are predetermined and measurable.
In line with market practices, they include the use of company cars and insurance policies (life, accident, supplementary health coverage).
The Policy provides for continuous monitoring of the domestic and foreign regulatory environment, best remuneration practices and general market trends in terms of pay-mix, levels and compensation systems, in order to ensure the competitiveness and guarantee the Group's ability to attract, retain, and motivate key profiles.
To this end, two separate analyses were conducted, concerning the remuneration package of the Chairman/CEO as well as the package of the other recipients of the Policy along with the direct reports of the Chairman/CEO. The Policy provides full disclosure of the benchmark peer group that has been defined according to the methodology developed by independent consultant Willis Towers Watson; the methodology used is based on rigorous criteria designed to ensure full comparability with Moncler, aligning the Policy with a competitive level consistent with companies comparable to Moncler.

For the Chairman/CEO's remuneration package, as part of ongoing market monitoring activities, the reference panel was defined by identifying specific companies that, in terms of size, industry and country, as well as internationality and business model, are overall comparable to Moncler.
One company that is no longer listed was excluded and, at the same time, as described above, new companies have been included in the panel to ensure size and business comparability. The updated panel thus ensures the representativeness of the companies of reference for Moncler in terms of the competitiveness of its remuneration offer and its ability to attract and retain talent, with particular reference to companies operating in the Luxury sector.
For the assessment of size comparability, the methodology adopted is based on 3 criteria: (i) number of employees, (ii) revenues, and (iii) market capitalization value. The analysis ensures dimensional comparability of the peer group with particular regard to market capitalization: Moncler, whose market capitalization is higher than the median figure of the peer group, ranks in the 46th percentile according to the prevailing weight of market capitalization compared to the other two dimensions selected in the benchmarking by the independent consultant. The panel also ensures representativeness of the Fashion & Luxury sector and geographical balance: comparable Italian and European companies that constitute the Company's target market are included.
As part of this analysis, the Chairman/CEO's remuneration package is substantially in line with the median values of the peer group of reference with respect to the fixed component and slightly below the median for total compensation, while the short-term variable component is lower than the market, as shown in the following chart.

The competitiveness of the remuneration packages of Top Management, and other Executive Directors and Managers with Strategic Responsibilities, was assessed with reference to a panel consisting exclusively of companies in the luxury sector.
In this case, in order to take into account certain size differences with some of the companies considered, the comparison was made on the basis of the organizational weight of the positions, which was calculated by applying the position grading methodology in use in the Moncler Group. In order to compare the roles with market benchmarks, a position weighting analysis was conducted, based on the grading methodology adopted by Willis Towers Watson.
Under this approach, Group Executive positions were evaluated on the basis of the extent of managerial responsibility (accountability), of know-how, as well as the managerial and problem-solving skills required to perform their respective roles. The Group positions thus evaluated were then compared against the relevant market benchmark, consisting of positions of the same grading.
The compensation analysis confirms that the medium- to long-term component plays a significant role in the remuneration of Moncler's top management, aligning with the Group's strategy. This approach balances the fixed and variable component, supporting the retention of key resources and the alignment of interests with stakeholders to achieve medium- to long-term objectives.
The short-term variable component (MBO, Management by Objectives) incentivizes recipients of the Remuneration Policy to achieve key annual objectives (economic/ financial, ESG and linked to strategic projects).
The MBO system provides for:
• full alignment with the Budget for the relevant fiscal year, as the KPIs are in line with what is provided in the annual Budget;
• Gucci
• Hermes • Hugo Boss
The MBO consists of two dimensions: a collective one, to incentivize performances that relate to the overall dimension for the Group, and an individual one, to recognize individual contributions to the achievement of strategic objectives of the Function.
The disbursement of the MBO is always subject to verification of the achievement of the objectives defined at the beginning of the relevant fiscal year. Exclusively in the case of recruitment during the fiscal year, for the first year of employment, a bonus may exceptionally be awarded, guaranteed entirely or in part, or entirely or in part linked to qualitative objectives of significant strategic-operational importance, in any case to an extent not exceeding 50% of the fixed component.
The MBO balanced score card of the Chairman/CEO and Executive Directors consists of 85% economic/financial objectives and the remaining 15% qualitative/planning KPIs.
| OBJECTIVE AND WEIGHT |
DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| EBIT 55% |
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (Operating Result). Indicator of operating profit before financial charges and taxes. |
| FREE CASH FLOW 30% |
Cash flow as reported in the reclassified consolidated statement indicated in the Management Report, "Performance Update" section, included in the consolidated financial statements of the Moncler Group, pre-IFRS 16 and net of "Changes in other assets/(liabilities)". |
| ESG 10% |
Annual objectives of the Strategic Sustainability Plan 2020-2025. |
| PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT 5% |
Employee business satisfaction survey. |
For MSRs, the percentage of influence of the objectives set out in the above table is modulated to include strategic and financial objectives of the Function, focused on economic/financial and operational performance, internal efficiency as well as certain projects relevant to the Function to which they belong. These objectives include, among others, sales and profitability objectives as well as project objectives related to the achievement of milestones relevant to the specific Function.


50
50
100
100
150
This KPI relates to the achievement of the objectives of the Strategic Sustainability Plan 2020-2025, with reference to the relevant year, related to the five pillars of the sustainability strategy3 :
The progress of the objectives is monitored on an ongoing basis through a computerized project management tool that allows for verification on a periodic basis throughout the year of the progress achieved with reference to individual objectives for final reporting purposes.
This KPI measures employee engagement toward their work and the company through the MONVoice survey, conducted each year globally. The survey collects opinions and feedback on various aspects, such as leadership, diversity, equity, inclusion, development, remuneration and internal processes. The results, collected in aggregate form and compared with international benchmarks, are used to hold the organization accountable and develop areas for improvement. The survey is conducted with the support of a specialized company and guarantees the anonymity of responses.
The MBO system involves the application of a linear performance curve and a multiplier.
3 All objectives are outlined in the Consolidated Sustainability Statement published annually on www.monclergroup.com website, "Sustainability/Documents" Section.

A performance curve is applied to the economic-financial objectives (i.e., EBIT and Free Cash Flow) with a threshold, target and maximum level. Depending on the target value, the payout is determined as follows:
There is no payout in case of performance below the threshold level and, in parallel, there is no higher payout in case of performance exceeding the maximum level; for intermediate results, the calculation of the relevant payout is done by linear interpolation.

Non-financial objectives are evaluated according to a scale with a threshold level of 50% of the relevant target. For this type of object, there is no payout level above 100% in the event of results above the target level.

| Level of achievement |
Payout | |
|---|---|---|
| Threshold | 50% | 50% |
| Target | 100% | 100% |

The multiplier is linked to Group EBIT performance and acts on the total balanced payout of the score card: it is activated exclusively from 101% achievement of the Group EBIT target, according to the following scale.
| LEVEL OF | 101% - | 102% - | 103% - | 104% - | 105% - | 106% - | 107% - |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACHIEVEMENT | 101.99% | 102.99% | 103.99% | 104.99% | 105.99% | 106.99% | >107% |
| % MULTIPLIER | 107% | 114% | 121% | 129% | 136% | 143% | 150% |
The total value of the MBO determined as above is subject to a cap in that the payout disbursed cannot exceed 150% of the fixed remuneration.
The incentive calculation mechanism is depicted in the chart below which is structured on the balanced score card applied to the Chairman/CEO and to Executive Directors
The sum of the payouts of the individual objectives , calculated according to the performance scale applicable to each, is then multiplied according to the applicable Multiplier level, thus providing the MBO [A]
payout . The same calculation mechanics are also applied for the MSRs, taking into consideration the relevant objectives assigned annually to each of them. [B]
| Target | Achievement | Payout | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| % | KPI | € MBO | Scale | % | % | |
| Max | + 7% vs budget | 107% | 150% | |||
| 55% | EBIT MONCLER GROUP |
550.000 | Target | Budget | 100% | 100% |
| Min | -2% vs budget | 98% | 50% | |||
| Max | + 10% vs budget | 110% | 150% | |||
| 30% | FREE CASH FLOW |
300.000 | Target | Budget | 100% | 100% |
| Min | -5% vs budget | 95% | 50% | |||
| 10% | ESG | 100.000 | Target ad hoc | 50-100% | 50-100% | |
| 5% | PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT |
50.000 | Target ad hoc | 50-100% | 50-100% | |
| 1.000.000 | [A] | |||||
| % Multiplier | x 107% → 150% = |
|||||
| MBO Payout | [B] |

The 2025 Policy does not include LTI plans to be submitted to the Shareholders' Meeting for approval as Moncler has opted to grant LTI plans every two years. LTI plans represent the medium- to long-term variable incentive tool adopted by the Company and provide for:
The following are currently underway:
The 2024 Plan was approved by the Shareholders' Meeting on 24 April 2024 and, as indicated above, consists of a single cycle (2024-2026).
| BENEFICIARIES | In continuity with previous plans, the 2024 Plan is reserved for the Chairman/ CEO, Executive Directors, MRS, employees and collaborators, including external consultants, of Moncler and its Subsidiaries who hold strategically relevant roles or are otherwise able to make a significant contribution, as identified by the Board of Directors, having heard the opinion of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee. |
|---|---|
| PURPOSES | • Tie the incentive system of the Group's management figures and key people to the actual performance of the Company and the creation of new value; • Further develop retention policies aimed at building the loyalty of key corporate figures and incentivizing their retention in the Moncler Group; • further develop attraction policies towards talented managerial and professional figures in order to continuously develop and strengthen Moncler's key and distinctive competencies. |
| FEATURES | Free of charge assignation of Shares (resulting from the purchase of treasury shares programs implemented in previous years): the 2024 Plan provides for the granting of "Moncler Rights," which entitle the beneficiaries, if performance objectives are achieved, to the assignation of one free Share for each "Moncler Right." The 2024 Plan, for the first time in comparison to previous plans, consists of a single attribution cycle of Shares (within the limits of the maximum number approved by the Shareholders' Meeting) in order to ensure an alignment among the beneficiaries of the 2024 Plan of the relevant terms of implementation (and therefore also of the vesting period which, for all beneficiaries, refers to the three-year period 2024-2026). |
| KPI AND WEIGHT | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| NET INCOME 70% |
The net income as reported in the consolidated income statement indicated in the Management Report/"Operating Performance" section, included in the consolidated financial statements of the Moncler Group. |
| FREE CASH FLOW 15% |
Cash flow as reported in the reclassified consolidated cash flow statement indicated in the Management Report/"Performance Update" section, included in the consolidated financial statements of the Moncler Group pre-IFRS 16 and net of the "Changes in other assets/(liabilities)". |
| Pillar: Nurture Uniqueness: a training program on Diversity, Equity and Inclusion topics to be completed by 100% of management (Managers, Senior Managers, Executives and Senior Executives) by 2026. |
|
| ESG | Pillar: Think Circular & Bold: 55% of nylon used in the 2026 collections coming from so-called preferred raw materials (i.e. recycled nylon, bio-based nylon) |
| 15% | Pillar: Act on Climate & Nature: certification, by 2026, for the new Moncler headquarters in Milan according to the LEED standard for Building Design and Construction which certifies the environmental efficiency of buildings, and the WELL standard for employee comfort and working conditions. |
| There is also, for the purpose of eventual achievement of over-performance, an additional objective reflecting the achievement of a high sustainability performance rating by one of the leading ESG rating companies4. |
A minimum, target and maximum level is set for each of the objectives against which the level of achievement of results is measured. The assignation of Shares is thus determined proportionally to the achievement of results and is calculated linearly for intermediate results.
The achievement of results below the minimum threshold with respect to the individual objectives results in the lack of assignation of Shares for the individual performance objective to which that result refers to. In fact, performance conditions operate independently of each other.
In the case of over-performance (i.e., exceeding the target level) the corresponding payout is increased linearly up to a maximum of 120% of the target value.
4 This objective is related to Moncler obtaining a score equal or higher than 80* in the S&P Global Corporate Sustainability Assessment or, alternatively, obtaining an A- or A rating from CDP Climate Change or obtaining an A or AA or AAA rating from MSCI Research or the acknowledgement by Sustainalytics of the Industry Top-Rated Badge or Regional Top-Rated badge. (*) Should S&P Global make significant methodological changes impacting average industry scoring, the threshold may be adjusted accordingly.
The performance conditions and resulting payout operate as follows:
Access threshold (resulting in an 80% payout):
Maximum payout (120% of target incentive):
The structure and related performance scale of the 2024 Plan is depicted below.
| WHEIGHT | PERFORMANCE / PAYOUT | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KPI % |
MINIMUM | TARGET | MAXIMUM | ||
| NET INCOME 70 |
Performance | -10% | Cumulative target from Plan |
+5% | |
| Payout | 80% | 100% | 120% | ||
| FREE CASH FLOW 15 |
Performance | -10% | Cumulative target from Plan |
+5% | |
| Payout | 80% | 100% | 120% | ||
| ESG | 15 | Performance | Achievement of the two ESG objectives |
Achievement of the three ESG objectives |
Achievement of the three ESG objectives and obtaining a high rating of the Group's sustainability performance by one of the leading ESG rating companies |
| Payout | 80% | 100% | 120% |
The Chairman/CEO, Executive Directors and MSRs are obliged to hold continuously, beyond the vesting period and receipt of the Shares, a number of Shares equal to 30% of those subject to the assignment, net of the Shares transferable for the payment of taxes, social security and welfare charges, if due, related to the assignment of Shares.
The restriction (unless authorized in writing by the Board of Directors, subject to the favorable opinion of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee) shall remain:

Pursuant to the regulations of the 2024 Plan, in the event of the award of cash sums in lieu of Shares, the beneficiaries are obligated to reinvest such sums in Shares to be held consistently with the above terms.
With reference to the effects of termination of the relationship on the 2024 Plan as well as the change of control scenario, please refer to Section 4.5 below.
The 2022 Plan was approved by the Shareholders' Meeting on 21 April 2022 and consists of two cycles (2022-2024 and 2023-2025). The purposes and characteristics of the 2022 Plan are similar to those in the 2024 Plan to which reference is made; likewise, the performance conditions and the resulting payout level operate through the same mechanism as in the 2024 Plan described above.
At the end of the Fiscal Year, the first cycle (2022-2024) came to an end, so please refer to Section II of the Report for information regarding the performance objectives and the related payout. The second cycle (2023-2025) is underway and will finish at the end of 2025.
The effects of termination with respect to the vesting of short-term (MBO) and medium-tolong-term (LTI) incentives under this Policy are summarized below.
| MBO | LTI |
|---|---|
| Termination of relationship If the termination occurs before the payment date, there is no bonus payment. |
Termination of relationship In case of Bad leaver (e.g., resignation, revocation for just cause): • the beneficiary will have no right to the Moncler Rights awarded, which will be extinguished. • no compensation and/or indemnity will be payable by Moncler for any damages and/or prejudice suffered by the beneficiaries. In case of Good leaver (retirement, expiration of term of office, death) the beneficiary (or his heirs) will retain rights to the Moncler Rights on a pro-rata temporis basis. |
| Change of control There is no specific discipline. |
Change of control and extraordinary events (takeover bid, delisting) There is a possibility to apply for early assignment of Shares (resulting in an acceleration of the vesting period), on a pro-rata temporis basis, subject to verification of the achievement of performance objectives by the Board of Directors. |

The Remuneration Policy envisages the possibility for Moncler to sign agreements with Executive Directors and/or Managers with Strategic Responsibilities regulating ex ante the economic aspects in the event of termination, including early termination, of the relationship at the initiative of the Company or the person concerned or in the event of non-renewal (indemnity / so-called parachute). Such agreements are subject to the prior evaluation and approval of the Board of Directors, having heard the favorable opinion of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee.
Indemnities may be provided in the following cases:
The Remuneration Policy also includes the option to provide severance packages upon termination of the office by the relevant beneficiary.
The Remuneration Policy provides for the possibility of entering into non-compete agreements with respect to Managers, Executives, as well as Executive Directors and Managers with Strategic Responsibilities that provide for (i) a maximum term of one year and (ii) consideration that ranges up to 100 % of fixed gross annual remuneration (the variable component being excluded) as well as additional provisions in line with market best practice.
In the event that both indemnity clauses and non-compete agreements as described above are applied in respect to Executive Directors and/or Managers with Strategic Responsibilities, their total amount may not exceed two years of fixed and variable remuneration (the latter calculated as the average of the last 3 MBOs paid), except as a result of specific legal provisions and/or in execution of the relevant national collective labor agreement.

The agreement between the Company and Roberto Eggs, Executive Director as well as Chief Business Strategy & Global Market Officer, under which his directorship with the Company is governed until 31 December 2027, provides for:
| CASE | TREATMENT | |
|---|---|---|
| • Removal without just cause • Failure to renew • Agreed resignation or consensual termination |
Indemnity (parachute) equal to Euro 1,598,000 |
The amounts (indemnity and non-compete) in total do not exceed 2 years of fixed and variable compensation (the latter calculated as the average of the last 3 MBOs |
| • Non compete | Euro 500,000 | paid). |
The existing contract between the Company and Gino Fisanotti, Manager with Strategic Responsibilities as well as Chief Brand Officer of Moncler, under which his directorship with the subsidiary Industries S.p.A. (Industries) is governed until the date of approval of Industries' financial statements as of December 31, 2026, provides for:
| CASE | TREATMENT | |
|---|---|---|
| • Removal without just cause • Failure to renew |
Indemnity (parachute) equal to Euro 1,035,0005 |
The amount (indemnity) in total does not exceed 2 years of fixed and variable compensation (the latter calculated as the average of the last 3 MBOs paid). |
5 Unless the contract is replaced during the term of office or upon its expiry by a different agreement at the same terms and conditions (e.g., by an employment contract).

The short-term incentive (MBO) and long-term incentive (LTI) schemes both include claw back/malus mechanisms.
Specifically, it is provided that the Company may request the return, within 3 years of the assignment, in whole or in part of variable components of remuneration (or withhold components subject to deferral or revoke Moncler Rights in the case of LTIs) whose assignment was determined on the basis of data or information that subsequently prove to be manifestly erroneous or in the event that the removal from the office or the termination of the contract is due to the achievement of objectively inadequate results or achieved as a result of conduct from which a significant loss to the Company has resulted or, in any case, as a result of fraudulent conduct or implemented with gross negligence to the detriment of the Company.
Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Bylaws, the remuneration of Non-Executive Directors is resolved upon by the Shareholders' Meeting: only a fixed component is provided for, appropriate to the competence, professionalism and commitment required by the tasks assigned to them on the Board and in the Board Committees.
The remuneration provided is equal to:
There is a Directors & Officers Liability (D&O) insurance policy and reimbursement of expenses incurred by reason of their office. No short- or medium- to long-term variable incentive components or benefits are applied.
The remuneration of the Board of Statutory Auditors is proportionate to the technical competence, experience, and commitment required by the role held as well as the dimensional and sectorial characteristics of the Company. For all members of the Board of Statutory Auditors, remuneration is composed exclusively of a fixed portion, which is not linked to the economic results achieved by the Company.
The compensation approved by the Shareholders' Meeting of 18 April 2023 is:
The Directors & Officers Liability (so-called D&O) insurance policy is also provided for the Statutory Auditors.
The Board, within the limits permitted by the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions, may temporarily derogate from the components that make up the Policy if this is necessary for the pursuit of the medium to long-term interests and financial sustainability of the Group as a whole, or to ensure its ability to remain in the market. This flexibility can be exercised by following Moncler's rigorous governance processes, complying with the RPT Procedure and providing full disclosure to the market.
The Nomination and Remuneration Committee, supported by the People & Organization and Corporate Affairs & Compliance Functions, is the body entrusted with the task of verifying the presence of situations in which it is necessary to exercise this flexibility, and to make any proposals for temporary derogations to the Remuneration Policy to the Board of Directors. The process also makes it necessary to involve the Related Party Transactions Committee, in accordance with the provisions of the RPT Procedure. All concerned individuals shall refrain from participating in Board discussions and resolutions regarding their own remuneration. The application of any derogation is disclosed through the subsequent report, accompanied by the reasons that prompted the Company to temporarily apply exceptions.
The elements that can be derogated, according to Policy 2025, are as follows:
The exceptional circumstances in which exemptions can potentially be applied are as follows:



INTRODUCTION PAY MIX ACHIEVEMENT OF VARIABILE INCENTIVE SYSTEM NON EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS BOARD OF STATUTORY AUDITORS CHANGE IN THE REMUNERATION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL BODY, THE GROUP'S RESULTS AND THE AVERAGE REMUNERATION OF GROUP EMPLOYEES TABLES

This Section describes the remuneration paid to the recipients of the Remuneration Policy during the Fiscal Year. The remuneration is reported on an accrual basis with reference to the fixed compensation accrued in 2024 and the short and long-term variable incentives accrued based on the performance achieved in 2024 and payable/assignable in 2025.
This Section provides disclosure on all relevant aspects of the implementation of the Remuneration Policy and, in particular, on the achievement of short-term (MBO) and medium-to long-term (LTI) objectives.
The compensation paid, as verified by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, was found to be consistent with the Remuneration Policy in force, particularly in terms of consistency between the accrued bonuses and the degree of achievement of the set objectives. According to the Committee's assessment, the Remuneration Policy was found to be substantially consistent with the observed market references, both in terms of overall positioning and pay mix.
The audit firm appointed to carry out the statutory audit of the financial statements (Deloitte & Touche S.p.A.) has verified the preparation of Section II of this Report through a formal check of the publication of the information contained therein.
For the purposes of this Section, it should be noted that:

Shown below is the proportion6 between fixed and variable compensation of the recipients of the Remuneration Policy, calculated based on the remuneration items accrued during the Fiscal Year.
| ABS | MBO | LTI |
|---|---|---|
| 23% | 19% | 58% |
| FIXED 23% | VARIABLE 77% |
| ABS | MBO | LTI |
|---|---|---|
| 28% | 15% | 57% |
| FIXED 28% | VARIABLE 72% |
| ABS | MBO | LTI |
|---|---|---|
| 24% | 15% | 61% |
| FIXED 24% | VARIABLE 76% |
| ABS | MBO | LTI |
|---|---|---|
| 26% | 13% | 61% |
| FIXED 26% | VARIABLE 74% |
To assess the level of achievement of MBO objectives, the Board reviews the Business Plan and related financial objectives, comparing them with market forecasts, so-called consensus. The Board verifies that the Business Plan does not deviate significantly from the consensus and, if it does, assesses with Management any deviations.
Specifically, the MBO objectives of the Chairman/CEO, as well as the other Executive Directors, were achieved as follows.
6 Fixed compensation is considered to be compensation for office, compensation for participation in Board-committees, non-monetary benefits and other compensation; short-term variable compensation includes profit sharing, bonuses and incentives; long-term variable compensation represents the fair value of equity compensation.
| FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES |
Group EBIT achieved at 102.5% compared to target set ex ante. Group Free Cash Flow achieved at 104.3% compared to target. |
|
|---|---|---|
| ESG | All targets of the Strategic Sustainability Plan expiring 31 December 2024 were achieved as better reported in the Sustainability Report7 |
|
| PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT |
KPI achieved at target level: the general engagement target, set between 74% and 78%, was achieved at 76%, as well as the specific target concerning the DE&I dimension, set between 76% and 80%, was achieved at 77%. |
Based on the level of achievement of each KPI, therefore, the payout percentage (determined by applying the performance curve) as well as the multiplier percentage (linked to Moncler's EBIT performance) applied to the MBO of the President/CEO is shown below.
| Target | Achievement* | Payout | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| % | KPI | € MBO | Scale | Curve | € | % | € | % | |
| Max | 970 €M | 150% | |||||||
| 55% | EBIT MONCLER GROUP |
550,000 | Target | 907 €M | 100% | 929 €M | 102.5 | 627,000 | 114 |
| Min | 889 €M | 50% | |||||||
| Max | 621 €M | 150% | |||||||
| 30% | FREE CASH FLOW ** |
300,000 | Target | 581 €M | 100% | 606 €M | 104.3 | 387,000 | 129 |
| Min | 569 €M | 50% | |||||||
| 10% | ESG | 100,000 | KPI ESG 2024 | All objectives achieved |
100.0 | 100,000 | 100 | ||
| 5% | PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT |
50,000 | MONVoice*** - overall 74-78%; - DE&I 76-80% |
- overall 76%; - DE&I 77% |
100.0 | 50,000 | 100 | ||
| 1,000,000 | % Multiplier | 1,164,000 x 114% |
|||||||
| = | |||||||||
| MBO Payout | 1.329.960 | ||||||||
| % MBO Payout vs Target |
133% |
* Achievement level accrued at constant exchange rates.
** Free Cash Flow adjusted for changes in other assets/(liabilities).
*** MONvoice: overall engagement rate calculated as the average of favorable responses (on a scale from 1 to 5, responses 4 and 5) over the total questionnaire; DE&I engagement rate calculated as the specific result of favorable responses on the cluster of questions related to DE&I topics.
7 Please refer to Section SBM-1 of the Consolidated Sustainability Statement.

On 13 February 2025, the Board, after the review of the Nomination and Remuneration and, with reference to the ESG KPI, of the Control, Risks and Sustainability Committee, verified the level of achievement of the objectives for the first attribution cycle of the 2022 Plan, and accordingly, Shares were released based on the same.
| FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES |
• Net Income achieved at 103.9% compared to target set ex ante; • Group Free Cash Flow achieved at 101.5% compared to target. |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All three ESG objectives were achieved during the reference period8: | ||||||
| • obtained Equal Pay Certification for the Moncler brand headquarters in Italy; | ||||||
| ESG | • over 50% of the nylon used in the Spring/Summer and Fall/Winter 2024 collections is made from so-called "preferred" materials; |
|||||
| • maintained carbon neutrality in 2024 at company-managed locations worldwide (offices, stores, production sites, and logistics hub) through 100% renewable electricity, 98% hybrid and electric vehicles in the Group's company car fleet and offsetting unavoidable residual emissions. |
||||||
| Moncler was confirmed in the Dow Jones Best-in-Class World and Europe indices for the three-year period 2022, 2023 and 2024, achieving the highest score in the Textiles, Apparel & Luxury Goods sector in the S&P Global Corporate Sustainability Assessment. |
Below is the achievement level of the KPIs with the corresponding payout percentage.
| % | KPI | Target | Achievement** | Payout | Weighted Payout |
|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| € | € | % | % | % | ||||
| Max | 1,856.2 | 120% | ||||||
| 70% | NET INCOME | Target | 1,767.8 | 100% | 1,836.7 | 103.9 | 115.6 | 80.9 |
| Min | 1,591.0 | 80% | ||||||
| Max | 1,617.2 | 120% | ||||||
| 15% | FREE CASH FLOW* | Target | 1,540.2 | 100% | 1,562.6 | 101.5 | 105.8 | 15.9 |
| Min | 1,386.2 | 80% | ||||||
| Max | 3 KPIs + rating |
120% | ||||||
| 15% | ESG | Target | 3 KPIs | 100% | 3 KPI + rating |
Max | 120 | 18 |
| Min | 2 KPIs | 80% | ||||||
| * Pre IFRS 16, net of change in other assets / (liabilities) | Weighted payout | 114.8 |
**Achievement level accrued at constant exchange rates.
8 During 2024, the audit firm Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. carried out certain agreed-upon verification procedures on the three ESG Performance Indicators included in the 2022 Performance Shares Plan, referring to the International Standard on Related Services (ISRS) 4400 (Revised) "Engagements to Perform Agreed-Upon Procedures" issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) and Assirevi Research Document No. 179R "Procedures Requested by the Company."

In 2024, the Chairman/CEO, Remo Ruffini, received a total of Euro 2,884,095 as detailed below.
| FIXED COMPENSATION |
The fixed compensation for the Chairman/CEO amounts to Euro 1,535,165, of which Euro 1,520,000 was received from Moncler, Euro 10,000 from Industries, and Euro 5,165 from Stone Island. |
|---|---|
| ANNUAL VARIABLE COMPENSATION: MBO 2024 |
The amount of Euro 1,326,960 was accrued based on the achievement level of the 2024 MBO objectives, as detailed in Paragraph 3.1, and the application of the performance curve and the corresponding multiplier. |
| MEDIUM-LONG TERM VARIABLE COMPENSATION: LTI |
In 2025, 145,038 Shares were released to the Chairman/CEO as part of the first cycle of the 2022 Plan. This assignment was made following the verification of the achievement of objectives by the Board of Directors on 13 February 2025, as detailed in Paragraph 3.2. Remo Ruffini is a beneficiary of the 2024 Plan, under which he was granted 95,181 Moncler Rights by resolution of the Board on 24 April 2024. |
| BENEFIT | The benefits include a company car for a total of Euro 21,970, of which Euro 14,912 was received from Moncler and EUR 7,057 from Industries. |
In 2024, Executive Director and Chief Business Strategy & Global Market Officer, Roberto Eggs, received a total of Euro 1,915,628 as detailed below.
| FIXED | The fixed compensation amounts to Euro 1,223,165, of which Euro 1,218,000 was |
|---|---|
| COMPENSATION | received from Moncler, and Euro 5,165 from Stone Island. |
| ANNUAL VARIABLE | The amount of Euro 633,480 was accrued based on the achievement level of the |
| COMPENSATION: | 2024 MBO objectives, as detailed in Paragraph 3.1, and the application of the |
| MBO 2024 | performance curve and the corresponding multiplier. |
| MEDIUM-LONG TERM VARIABLE COMPENSATION: LTI |
In 2025, 92,087 Shares were released to Roberto Eggs as part of the first cycle of the 2022 Plan. This assignment was made following the verification of the achievement of objectives by the Board of Directors on 13 February 2025, as detailed in Paragraph 3.2. Roberto Eggs is a beneficiary of the 2024 Plan, under which he was granted 60,432 Moncler Rights by resolution of the Board on 24 April 2024. |
| BENEFIT | Benefits include a company car, life insurance, accident insurance and supplementary health insurance for a value of Euro 28,983. |

In 2024, Executive Director and Chief Corporate & Supply Officer, Luciano Santel, received a total of Euro 1,619,849 as detailed below.
| FIXED | The fixed compensation amounts to Euro 965,165, of which Euro 770,000 was received |
|---|---|
| COMPENSATION | from Moncler, Euro 190,000 from Industries and Euro 5,165 from Stone Island. |
| ANNUAL VARIABLE | The amount of Euro 623,671 was accrued based on the achievement level of the 2024 |
| COMPENSATION: | MBO objectives, as detailed in Paragraph 3.1, and the application of the performance |
| MBO 2024 | curve and the corresponding multiplier. |
| MEDIUM-LONG TERM VARIABLE COMPENSATION: LTI |
In 2025, 92,087 Shares were released to Luciano Santel as part of the first cycle of the 2022 Plan. This assignment was made following the verification of the achievement of objectives by the Board of Directors on 13 February 2025, as detailed in Paragraph 3.2. Luciano Santel is a beneficiary of the 2024 Plan, under which he was granted 60,432 Moncler Rights by resolution of the Board on 24 April 2024. |
| BENEFIT | Benefits include a company car, life insurance, accident insurance and supplementary health insurance for a value of Euro 31,013. |
In 2024 MSRs received a total of Euro 3,624,734, as illustrated in the table below.
| FIXED COMPENSATION |
The fixed compensation amounts to Euro 2,286,000, of which Euro 450,000 were received from Moncler, and EUR 1,836,000 from Industries. |
||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ANNUAL VARIABLE COMPENSATION: MBO 2024 |
The amount of Euro 1,233,216 (of which 265,708 from Moncler and 967,508 from Industries) was accrued based on the achievement level of the 2024 MBO objectives, as detailed in Paragraph 3.1, and the application of the performance curve and the corresponding multiplier. |
||||||
| MEDIUM-LONG | In 2025, 92,089 Shares were released to MSRs as part of the first cycle of the 2022 Plan. This assignment was made following the verification of the achievement of objectives by the Board of Directors on 13 February 2025, as detailed in Paragraph 3.2. |
||||||
| TERM VARIABLE COMPENSATION: |
Some MSRs are beneficiaries of the 2022 Plan, second cycle, under which they were granted 85,048 Moncler Rights by resolution of the Board on April 24, 2023. |
||||||
| LTI | MSRs are also beneficiaries of the 2024 Plan, under which they were granted 115,828 Moncler Rights by resolution of the Board on 24 April2024. |
||||||
| BENEFIT | Benefits include acompany car, life insurance, accident insurance and supplementary health insurance for a value of Euro 105,517. |

During the Fiscal Year no indemnities or other benefits were paid for the termination of office or termination of employment.
During the year, no ex post correction mechanisms were applied to the variable component (malus or return or clawback of variable remuneration).
The Company, during the Financial Year, did not apply any exceptions to the Remuneration Policy.
In accordance with the resolution passed by the Shareholders' Meeting of 21 April 2022:
Details of the remuneration for the Fiscal Year are shown in Table 1. Table 4 shows the shareholdings held by the considered individuals.
The Ordinary Shareholders' Meeting held on 18 April 2023 appointed the Board of Statutory Auditors in office as of the date of the Report, granting them a fixed remuneration of Euro 80,000 gross per year for the Chairman and Euro 60,000 gross per year for the other Standing Auditors.
Details of the remuneration for the Year are shown in Table 1.
There are no monetary and non-monetary benefits for the Statutory Auditors except for the insurance policy.
The table below shows the change in the total remuneration paid to the Directors and Statutory Auditors of Moncler in office at the date of the Report, the economic performance of Moncler in terms of EBIT and the gross annual remuneration of full-time employees in the five-year period 2019-2024.
To this end, the total gross annual remuneration, which includes the fixed component, the short-term variable component and the fair market value of the long-term variable component, has been taken into account.
In particular, it should be noted that the 2023-2024 change in the remuneration actually received by the Chairman/CEO is mostly due to the achievement level of short-term variable remuneration, achieved in 2024 at 133% of target level, as compared to 214% in 2023.
| ROLE | CHANGE 2020-2021 |
CHANGE 2021-2022 |
CHANGE 2022-2023 |
CHANGE 2023-2024 |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Remo Ruffini | Chairman/CEO | 20.1% | 49.5% | 31.7% | -30.0%9 |
| Roberto Eggs | Executive Director |
19.0% | 6.6% | -6.9% | -1.2%10 |
| Luciano Santel | Executive Director |
22.6% | 9.8% | -9.1% | 10.5%11 |
| Marco De Benedetti |
Non-Executive Director |
0% | 89.5% | 20.6% | 0% |
| Bettina Fetzer | Indipendent Director |
- | - | 43.7% | 0% |
| Gabriele Galateri di Genola |
Indipendent Director |
0% | 94.9% | 21.3% | 0% |
| Alessandra Gritti | Indipendent Director |
0% | 132.9% | 24.9% | 0% |
| Jeanne Jackson | Indipendent Director |
- | - | 43.7% | 0% |
| Diva Moriani | Indipendent Director |
0% | 89.5% | 20.6% | 0% |
| Guido Pianaroli | Indipendent Director |
0% | 89.5% | 20.6% | 0% |
| Carlo Rivetti | Non-Executive Director |
- | 45.8% | 4.3% | -53.4%12 |
| Maria Sharapova | Indipendent Director |
- | - | 43.7% | 0% |
| Riccardo Losi | Chairman of the Board of Statutory Auditors |
0% | 0% | 23.5% | 8.0%13 |
| Carolyn Dittmeier | Statutory Auditor |
80.3% | 0% | 32.6% | 10.3%14 |
| Nadia Fontana | Statutory Auditor |
80.3% | 0% | 32.6% | 10.3%15 |
| Median annual gross total employee compensation16 |
-1.8% | 5.0% | -0.8% | ||
| EBIT17 Reported | 57.0% | 33.7% | 15.4% | 2.5% |

9 This variation is mainly due to the accrual of the short-term variable component (133% of the target incentive, compared to 214% in 2023), as well as the impact of the medium-long-term variable component, as detailed in Table 3 A below.
10 See note 9.
11 See note 9.
12 This variation follows the end of the term of office (2021-2023) of Stone Island's Board of Directors, previously in office, under which the remuneration provided for Carlo Rivetti was determined in accordance with the provisions of the agreements executed as part of the Stone Island Transaction and which do not, however, apply to the current term of office (2024-2026).
13 This change is due to the applicability to the entire 2024 fiscal year of the remuneration provided for the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors resolved by the Shareholders' Meeting on 18 April 2023.
14 Please refer to note 13.
15 Please refer to note 13.
16 Median gross annual total remuneration of the total number of employees, which includes the fixed component, the short-term variable component and the fair market value of the long-term variable component, calculated on a full-time equivalent basis.
17 EBIT Reported as reflected in the Annual Financial Report.

| Name and Surname |
Position | Period when the position |
Expiry of term | Fixed remuneration |
Compensation for participation |
Variable non-equity compensation |
Non-monetary | Other | Total | Fair value of equity |
Indemnities for end of office or |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| held | was held | of office | for the position18 |
in Committees 19 | Profit sharing |
Bonuses and other incentives22 |
benefits20 | compensation | compensation 21 |
termination of employment |
||
| Remo Ruffini |
Chairman/ Chief Executive Officer |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for |
|||||||||
| Remuneration of the company preparing | y/e 31/12/2024 | 1,520,00023 | 1,326,960 | 14,912 | 2,861,872 | 3,993,287 | ||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | 15,16524 | 7,057 | 22,222 | ||||||||
| Total | 1,535,165 | 1,326,960 | 21,970 | 2,884,095 | 3,993,287 | |||||||
| Non-Executive Director |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Marco | Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
100,000 | 60,000 25 |
160,000 | ||||||||
| De Benedetti |
Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||||
| Total | 100,000 | 60,000 | 160,000 | |||||||||
| Executive Director |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Roberto | Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
1,218,00026 | 663,480 | 28,983 | 1,910,463 | 2,535,407 | ||||||
| Eggs | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | 5,16527 | 5,165 | |||||||||
| Total | 1,223,165 | 663,480 | 28,983 | 1,915,628 | 2,535,407 | |||||||
| Independent Director |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Bettina | Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
100,000 | 100,000 | |||||||||
| Fetzer | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||||
| Total | Approval | 100,000 | 100,000 | |||||||||
| Independent Director |
2024 | of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Gabriele Galateri |
Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
100,000 | 30,00028 | 130,000 | ||||||||
| di Genola | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||||
| Total | Approval | 100,000 | 30,000 | 130,000 | ||||||||
| Independent Director |
2024 Remuneration of the company preparing |
of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Alessandra Gritti |
the financial statements | 100,000 | 60,00029 | 160,000 | ||||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | ||||||||||||
| Total | Approval | 100,000 | 60,000 | 160,000 | ||||||||
| Independent Director |
2024 Remuneration of the company preparing |
of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Jeanne Jackson |
the financial statements | 100,000 | 100,000 | |||||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | ||||||||||||
| Total | Approval | 100,000 | 100,000 | |||||||||
| Independent Director |
of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
|||||||||||
| Diva | Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
100,000 | 60,00030 | 160,000 | ||||||||
| Moriani | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||||
| Total | 100,000 | 60,000 | 160,000 | |||||||||
| Guido Pianaroli |
Independent Director |
Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
100,000 | 60,00031 | 160,000 | |||||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | ||||||||||||
| Total | 100,000 | 60,000 | 160,000 | |||||||||
| Non-Executive Director |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for |
||||||||||
| Carlo Rivetti |
Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
y/e 31/12/2024 | 100,000 | 100,000 | ||||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | 104,93332 | 2,828 | 107,761 | |||||||||
| Total | 204,933 | 2,828 | 207,761 |
| Name and Surname |
Position held |
Period when the position |
Expiry of term | Fixed remuneration for the |
Compensation for participation |
Variable non-equity compensation |
Non-monetary 16 |
Other | Total | Fair value of equity |
Indemnities for end of office or |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| was held | of office | position14 | in Committees 15 | Profit sharing |
Bonuses and other incentives18 |
benefits | compensation | compensation 17 |
termination of employment |
|||
| Executive Director |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Luciano | Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
770,00033 | 530,784 | 23,495 | 1,324,279 | 2,535,407 | ||||||
| Santel | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | 195,16534 | 92,887 | 7,518 | 295,570 | |||||||
| Total | 965,165 | 623,671 | 31,013 | 1,619,849 | 2,535,407 | |||||||
| Independent Director |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2024 |
||||||||||
| Maria | Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
100,000 | 100,000 | |||||||||
| Sharapova | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||||
| Total | 100,000 | 100,000 | ||||||||||
| Riccardo | Chairman of the Statutory Board |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2025 |
|||||||||
| Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
80,000 | 80,000 | ||||||||||
| Losi | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||||
| Total | 80,000 | 80,000 | ||||||||||
| Standing auditor |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2025 |
||||||||||
| Carolyn | Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
60,000 | 60,000 | |||||||||
| Dittmeier | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||||
| Total | 60,000 | 60,000 | ||||||||||
| Standing auditor |
2024 | Approval of financial statements for y/e 31/12/2025 |
||||||||||
| Nadia | Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
60,000 | 60,000 | |||||||||
| Fontana | Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||||
| Total | 60,000 | 60,000 | ||||||||||
| 2024 | ||||||||||||
| Managers with Strategic Responsibilities (4) |
Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements |
450,000 | 265,708 | 16,380 | 732,088 | 5,711,888 | ||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | 1,836,000 | 967,508 | 89,138 | 2,892,646 | ||||||||
| Total | 2,286,000 | 1,233,216 | 105,517 | 3,624,734 | 5,711,888 |
| Name and Surname |
Position | Plan | FInancial instruments assigned in previous years not vested during the year |
Financial instruments assigned during the year | Financial instruments vested during the year which cannot be allocated |
Financial instruments vested during the year which can be allocated |
Financial instruments accrued during the year |
||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number and type of financial instruments |
Vesting period |
Number and type of financial instruments |
Fair value on award date |
Vesting period |
Date of allocation |
Market price on allocation |
Number and type of financial instruments |
Number and type of financial instruments |
Valore alla data di maturazione |
Fair value 35 |
|||
| Remo Ruffini |
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |
Performance Shares |
|||||||||||
| Remuneration of the company preparing | Plan 2024 | 95,181 | 6,358,091 | 2024-26 | 24/04/2024 | 66.80 | 1,444,848 | ||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | ||||||||||||
| Total | 95,181 | 6,358,091 | 2024-26 | 24/04/2024 | 66.80 | 1,444,848 | |||||||
| Remo Ruffini |
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |
2022 Performance Shares Plan, cycle I |
|||||||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration of the company preparing | 126.355 | 2022-24 | 145,038 | 7,394,037 | 2,548,440 | |||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | |||||||||||||
| Total | 126.355 | 2022-24 | 145,038 | 7,394,037 | 2,548,440 | ||||||||
| Roberto Eggs |
Executive Director |
Performance Shares Plan 2024 |
|||||||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration of the company preparing | 60,432 | 4,036,858 | 2024-26 | 24/04/2024 | 66.80 | 917,358 | ||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | |||||||||||||
| Total | 60,432 | 4,036,858 | 2024-26 | 24/04/2024 | 66.80 | 917,358 | |||||||
| Roberto Eggs |
Executive Director |
2022 Performance Shares Plan, cycle I |
|||||||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration of the company preparing | 80.225 | 2022-24 | 92,087 | 4,694,595 | 1,618,049 | |||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | |||||||||||||
| Total | 80.225 | 2022-24 | 92,087 | 4,694,595 | 1,618,049 | ||||||||
| Luciano Santel |
Executive Director |
Performance Shares Plan 2024 |
|||||||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration of the company preparing | 60,432 | 4,036,858 | 2024-26 | 24/04/2024 | 66.80 | 917,358 | ||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | |||||||||||||
| Total | 60,432 | 4,036,858 | 2024-26 | 24/04/2024 | 66.80 | 917,358 | |||||||
| Luciano Santel |
Executive Director |
2022 Performance Shares Plan, cycle I |
|||||||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration of the company preparing | 80.225 | 2022-24 | 92,087 | 4,694,595 | 1,618,049 | |||||||
| Total | Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | 80.225 | 2022-24 | 92,087 | 4,694,595 | 1,618,049 | |||||||
| Managers with Strategic Responsibilities (4) |
Performance Shares |
||||||||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration of the company preparing | Plan 2024 | 115,828 | 7,737,310 | 2024-26 | 24/04/2024 | 66.80 | 1,758,269 | |||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | |||||||||||||
| Total | 115,828 | 7,737,310 | 2024-26 | 24/04/2024 | 66.80 | 1,758,269 | |||||||
| Managers with Strategic Responsibilities (4) |
2022 Performance Shares Plan, cycle I |
||||||||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration of the company preparing | 80,226 | 2022-24 | 92,087 | 4,694,697 | 1,618,069 | |||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | |||||||||||||
| Total | 80,226 | 2022-24 | 92,087 | 4,694,697 | 1,618,069 | ||||||||
| Managers with Strategic Responsibilities (4) |
2022 Performance Shares Plan, cycle II |
||||||||||||
| the financial statements | Remuneration of the company preparing | 85,048 | 2023-25 | 2,335,550 | |||||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries or associates | |||||||||||||
| Total | 85,048 | 2023-25 | 2,335,550 |
| Position | Plan | Bonus for the year36 | Bonuses from previous years | Other | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name and Surname | Payable/ Disbursed |
Deferred | Reporting period |
No longer payable |
Payable/ Disbursed |
Deferred | Bonuses | ||
| Remo Ruffini | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |
Annual incentive (2024 MBO) |
|||||||
| Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements | 1,326,960 | 2024 | |||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||
| Total | 1,326,960 | 2024 | |||||||
| Roberto Eggs | Executive Director |
Annual incentive (2024 MBO) |
|||||||
| Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements | 663,480 | 2024 | |||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | |||||||||
| Total | 663,480 | 2024 | |||||||
| Luciano Santel | Executive Director |
Annual incentive (2024 MBO) |
|||||||
| Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements | 530,784 | 2024 | |||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | 92,887 | 2024 | |||||||
| Total | 623,671 | 2024 | |||||||
| Managers with Strategic Responsibilities (4) | Annual incentive (2024 MBO) |
||||||||
| Remuneration of the company preparing the financial statements | 265,708 | 2024 | |||||||
| Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates | 967,508 | 2024 | |||||||
| Total | 1,233,216 | 2024 |
35 The share-based compensation accrued during the fiscal year is shown, calculated by distributing the fair value of the instruments on the assignment date, calculated using actuarial techniques, over the vesting period.
36 The annual incentive (MBO) is paid in 2025, following the approval of the financial statements for the fiscal year as of 31 December 2024 resolved on by the Board of Directors.

| Name and Surname | Position held | Type of ownership | Shareholding in | Number of shares held as at 31/12/2023 |
Number of shares purchased |
Number of shares sold |
Number of shares held as at 31/12/2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Remo Ruffini | Chairman | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | 187,889 | 169,01437 | 141,63438 | 215,269 |
| and CEO | Indirect - Ordinary shares39 |
65,145,179 | 1,878,29540 | 21,703,30041 | 45,320,174 | ||
| Marco De | Vice-Chairman | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
|||||
| Benedetti | and Non-Executive Director |
Indirect - Ordinary shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Independent | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
||||||
| Bettina Fetzer | Director | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Executive | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
222,775 | 21,35342 | 81,12243 | 163,006 | ||
| Roberto Eggs | Director | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Gabriele Galateri | Independent | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
1,420 | 1,420 | |||
| di Genola | Director | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Independent | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | |||||
| Alessandra Gritti | Director | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
|||||
| Independent Director |
Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | |||||
| Jeanne Jackson | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
||||||
| Diva Moriani | Independent Director |
Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Indirect - Ordinary shares |
|||||||
| Guido Pianaroli | Independent Director |
Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Indirect - Ordinary shares |
|||||||
| Carlo Rivetti | Non-Executive Director |
Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Indirect - Ordinary shares44 |
10,731,11645 | -46 | 10,731,11647 | - | |||
| Luciano Santel | Executive | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | 155,107 | 77,02848 | 78,079 | |
| Director | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
||||||
| Maria Sharapova | Independent | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Director | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
||||||
| Riccardo Losi | Chairman of the Board of |
Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Statutory Auditors | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
||||||
| Carolyn Dittmeier | Standing | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | ||||
| Auditor | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
||||||
| Nadia Fontana | Standing | Direct - Ordinary Shares |
Moncler S.p.A. | 150 | 150 | ||
| Auditor | Indirect - Ordinary shares |

| Number of managers with strategic responsibilities |
Shareholding in | Type of ownership | Number of shares owned as at 31/12/2023 |
Number of shares purchased |
Number of shares sold | Number of shares owned as at 31/12/2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct - Ordinary Shares |
155,864 | 73,45250 | 22,51451 | 206,802 | ||
| 449 | Moncler S.p.A. | Indirect - Ordinary shares |
51 Sale of Shares under the performance shares plans of Moncler.
37 Free assignment of shares under the 2020 Performance Shares Plan, second cycle.
38 Free assignment of Shares under the performance shares plans of Moncler.
39 The indirect shareholding is held through Double R S.r.l. (Double R), 90% owned as of 31 December 2024 by Ruffini Partecipazioni Holding S.r.l. (RPH), a company whose share capital is wholly owned by Remo Ruffini.
40 This refers to the total number of Shares that Double R has purchased as of 31 December 2024, as part of the Share purchase program initiated under the partnership between RPH and LVMH Moët Hennessy – Louis Vuitton, announced on 26 September 2024. Under the agreements, it was agreed that Double R would increase its stake in Moncler up to a maximum of 18.5% through a purchase program of Moncler Shares over a period of approximately 18 months, with the financing for these purchases provided by LVMH, which will increase its investment in Double R up to a maximum of approximately 22% of the capital. For further information, please refer to the essential information of the shareholders' agreement and the investment agreement signed as part of the transaction, available on the website www.monclergroup.com , under the "Governance/Documents and Procedures" section.
41 This refers to the total number of Shares that Double R has assigned to Venezio Investments Pte. Ltd. (Venezio) and Grinta S.r.l. (Grinta, a company linked to the Rivetti family, established solely for the purpose of the contribution of the Moncler Shares in Double R and controlled by Carlo Rivetti through Rivetex S.r.l. (Rivetex)) following the exercise of the right of withdrawal by the latters, as announced on 21 January 2024 (with reference to Venezio) and on 24 February 2024 (for Grinta). Following the completion of the withdrawal procedure, on 12 March 2024, Double R assigned 10,972,184 shares to Venezio and 10,731,116 shares to Grinta.
42 Free assignment of Shares under the 2020 Performance Shares Plan, second cycle.
43 Free assignment of Shares under the performance shares plans of Moncler.
44 The indirect shareholding was held through Grinta , as detailed in the next note.
45 These are the Shares that had initially been assigned to Rivetex and the other members of the Rivetti family following the capital increase resolved by Moncler in 2021 as part of the Stone Island Transaction; these Shares, in 2022, were transferred (through Grinta, to which Rivetex and the other members of the Rivetti family had transferred the Moncler Shares) into Double R, pursuant to the undertaken agreements. As indicated above, upon Grinta's withdrawal from Double R, on 12 March 2024, these Shares were then assigned to Grinta.
46 As indicated above, on 12 March 2024, this are the Shares which were contributed to Grinta upon the latter's withdrawal from Double R, in accordance with the undertaken agreements .
47 On 18 March 2024, Grinta sold 3,231,116 Shares through Accelerated Book Building (ABB), retaining ownership of 7,500,000 shares; on 10 September 2024, Grinta sold (through ABB and to JP Morgan) all the remaining shares (amounting to 7,500,000).
48 Sale of Shares under the performance shares plans of Moncler.
49 The number does not include Carlo Rivetti as the information is provided in Table 1.
50 Shares assigned free of charge under the 2020 Performance Shares Plan, second cycle.

| 2022 Plan | The share-based incentive plan named "2022 Performance Shares Plan" approved by the Shareholders' Meeting on 21 April 2022 |
|---|---|
| 2024 Plan | The share-based incentive plan named "Performance Shares 2024 Plan" approved by the Shareholders Meeting on 24 April 2024 |
| Board of Directors or Board | The board of directors of Moncler |
| Board of Statutory Auditors or Statutory Auditors |
The board of statutory Auditors of Moncler |
| By-Laws | The by-laws of Moncler in force at the date of the Report |
| CEO | The Chief Executive Officer, i.e., the person responsible for the management of the company identified as the Chairman and Executive Director of Moncler, Remo Ruffini |
| Corporate Governance Code or CG Code | The Corporate Governance Code for listed companies in force at the date of this Report, approved by the Corporate Governance Committee and promoted by Borsa Italiana S.p.A., ABI, Ania, Assogestioni, Assonime and Confindustria |
| Consolidated Law on Finance or TUF | Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 February 1998, as subsequently amended and supplemented |
| Consolidated Sustainability Statement | The consolidated sustainability statement pursuant to Legislative Decree no. 125/2024. |
| Fiscal Year | The fiscal year ended 31 December 2024 to which the Report relates to |
| Issuers' Regulation or IR | The Regulation issued by Consob by resolution no. 11971 of 14 May 1999 on issuers, as subsequently amended and supplemented |
| LTI | The medium-long term share-based incentive scheme |
| Managers with Strategic Responsibilities or Strategic Managers or MSRs |
People who have the power and responsibility – directly or indirectly – for planning, managing and controlling the Company's activities, as defined in Annex 1 of the RPT Regulation |
| MBO | The short-term, variable, management by objectives, incentive system |
| Moncler or Company | Moncler S.p.A., a company having its registered office at via Stendhal no. 47, Milan, fiscal code, VAT ID and Milano- Monza-Brianza-Lodi Companies Register No. 04642290961 |
| Moncler Group or Group | Jointly, Moncler and its direct or indirect subsidiaries pursuant to Art. 93 of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance at the date of the Report |
| Nomination and Remuneration Committee or the Committee |
The nomination and remuneration committee established within the Moncler Board of Directors pursuant to the Corporate Governance Code |
| Remuneration Policy or Policy or 2025 Policy |
The Company's policy regarding the remuneration of members of the Board of Directors, MSRs and the Board of Statutory Auditors of the Company for 2025 submitted to the vote of the Shareholders' Meeting of 16 April 2025. |

| Report | The present report on the remuneration and compensation policy drawn up pursuant to Art. 123-ter of the Consolidated Law on Finance and Art. 84-quater of the Issuers' Regulation |
|---|---|
| RPT Regulation | The regulation issued by Consob by resolution no. 17221 of 12 March 2010 on related-party transactions, as subsequently amended and supplemented |
| Shares | The Company's shares |
| Shareholders' Meeting | The shareholders' meeting of Moncler |
| SPW or Stone Island | Sportswear Company S.p.A., whose share capital is entirely owned by Moncler |
| Stone Island Transaction | Moncler's purchase of Stone Island's entire share capital, completed on 31 March 2021 |
| Strategic Committee | The advisory committee formed to support the Chairman and CEO in defining and implementing strategic guidelines, to link and share activities between the main strategic areas of the Company and the Group |
| Subsidiaries | Companies directly or indirectly controlled by Moncler pursuant to Art. 93 of the Consolidated Law on Finance |




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