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GOLDEN CROSS RESOURCES LTD — Proxy Solicitation & Information Statement 2014
Feb 18, 2014
64971_rns_2014-02-18_d4f63907-44e8-4d34-9d22-dc69078454b7.pdf
Proxy Solicitation & Information Statement
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GOLDEN CROSS RESOURCES LTD
ABN 65 063 075 178
22 Edgeworth David Ave Hornsby NSW 2077 Phone (02) 9472 3500 Fax (02) 9482 8488
19 February 2014
HQ Mining letter to GCR shareholders
We attach a letter dated 18 February 2014 from HQ Mining Resources Holding Pty Ltd to Golden Cross shareholders.
We are reviewing the HQ Mining letter and will make a statement about it shortly.
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HQ Mining Resources Holding Pty Ltd
18 February 2014
Dear Shareholders
HQ recommends that GCR shareholders:
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VOTE AGAINST the share placement proposal by Heron Resources Limited (Heron); and
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VOTE IN FAVOUR of the pro-rata rights issue proposal from HQ Mining Resources Holding Pty Ltd (HQ),
at the extraordinary general meeting on Thursday 27 February 2014 ( the EGM).
It is important that you VOTE AGAINST the share placement proposal by Heron, because if the Heron proposal is passed, the chairman will not be putting the pro-rata rights issue proposal from HQ to the EGM.
HQ has offered to:
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take up its entitlement under a pro-rata rights offer by GCR to issue 680,000,000 ordinary shares (or such lesser amount determined by Golden Cross Resources Limited ( GCR ), but not less than 375,970,579 shares) at an issue price of $0.005 per share, which would raise up to A$3,400,000 for GCR; and
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underwrite, on an exclusive basis and for no cost to GCR any remaining shortfall under the rights offer, but only after all GCR shareholders who wish to do so have subscribed for additional shares (in excess of the rights entitlement) that are not taken up by other shareholders, up to their respective pro-rata share of any shortfall,
(the HQ Proposal ).
On the other hand, Heron has offered, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions, to subscribe for 375,970,579 GCR shares at $0.005 per share to raise $1,879,853 representing 19.9% in the enlarged share capital of GCR (the Heron Proposal ).
Heron has recently sent to GCR shareholders a letter setting out a number of reasons on why, in its view, GCR shareholders should support the Heron proposal and reject the HQ proposal ( Heron Letter ). Many of the statements in the Heron Letter are incorrect or misleading, and may result in GCR shareholders voting in a manner contrary to their best interests if left uncorrected. The following table sets out HQ’s corrections and clarifications to those assertions
| Heron’s assertion | Correction/clarification |
|---|---|
| This certainty of immediate | Heron’s assertion that there would be a delay in GCR |
| timing contrasts with the | shareholders receiving their consideration under the HQ |
| extended timetable likely to | Proposal due to “shareholder approval” or “other regulatory |
| extend to or beyond mid | requirements” is legally incorrect and without basis. |
| April 2014 associated with | |
| the receipt of proceeds | The HQ Proposal does not require any shareholder approval |
| from any underwriting of a | under either the ASX Listing Rules or the Corporations Act: |
page 1
| Heron’s assertion | Correction/clarification | Correction/clarification |
|---|---|---|
| further rights issue from HQ | • |
No shareholder approval is required for “placement |
| which, because of HQ’s | capacity” purposes under ASX Listing Rules | |
| existing shareholding in | 7.1/7.1A, since the HQ Proposal fall under the | |
| Golden Cross, may require | exceptions in ASX Listing Rule 7.2. | |
| shareholder approval or | • | No shareholder approval is required for “persons in |
| may be delayed to meet | position of influence” purposes under ASX Listing | |
| other regulatory | Rule 10.11, since HQ is not a related party of GCR | |
| requirements. | and, even if it was, the HQ Proposal falls under the | |
| exceptions in ASX Listing Rule 10.12. | ||
| Page 1, 1st item, 2nd paragraph |
• | No shareholder approval is required under Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act (in particular, item 7 of |
| section 611) since the HQ Proposal is covered by | ||
| section 611. |
There are fewer conditions This statement is misleading and does not consider the attached to the Heron substantive effect of the conditions attaching to each Offer, and they are almost proposal. wholly within the control or influence of the Golden The HQ Proposal is conditional on the Heron Proposal not Cross board. being approved at the EGM and not proceeding. Further, the HQ Proposal is conditional on none of the events in Page 2, 3rd item paragraph (a)-(h) of section 652C(1), or in paragraph (a)-(e) of section 652C(2) of the Corporations Act, occurring. Each of these conditions go to the value of the shares to be offered for subscription, and do not pose a risk to the HQ Proposal proceeding as they are matters within the control of GCR.
On the other hand, the Heron Proposal contains conditions such as no material adverse change, no change to board and senior management composition, appointment of a Heron representative to the GCR board, no suspension from trading, no regulatory actions and no court orders, which are conditions above and beyond the conditions that are attached to the HQ Proposal. Some of these conditions are not within the control of GCR and/or limit its operational flexibility.
A comparison of the conditionality of both proposals shows that the HQ Proposal enjoys higher execution certainty for GCR, and maximises the likelihood that the capitalisation of GCR will proceed according to plan.
There are no significant There is no basis to assert that there would be “months of costs to Golden Cross in delays” associated with the implementation of the HQ accepting the Heron Offer, Proposal, particularly given that no shareholder approvals which contrasts with the are required for the HQ Proposal to proceed (see above). months of delays and costs likely under the HQ Mining In addition, HQ has offered to underwrite the pro-rata rights Competing Proposal. offer in its proposal for no cost to GCR.
Page 3, 1st item, 1st paragraph
page 2
| Heron’s assertion | Correction/clarification |
|---|---|
| Introduces an Aligned | Heron’s operations in recent years focus on exploring and |
| Strategic Shareholder with | selling off mining assets, rather than from building and |
| significant experience in | operating successful mines. Hence, Heron is unlikely to be |
| exploration and | an aligned strategic shareholder with relevant experience to |
| development | help GCR to transform itself from a predominantly |
| exploration company into a mining company. | |
| Page 3, 2nd item | |
| The Heron Proposal specifically contemplates that GCR will | |
| spend more than three quarters of the money Heron intends | |
| to put up (ie $1.45 million out of $1.88 million) into the | |
| exploration of Copper Hill, leaving little of that money for | |
| GCR’s other business. On the other hand, the HQ Proposal | |
| offers GCR a significantly greater amount of funding (at | |
| GCR’s discretion), with no limitations as to its deployment. | |
| Heron’s drilling exploration programme for Cooper Hill is high | |
| risk and may not locate substantial mineralisation. | |
| There is also the prospect that Heron will indirectly benefit | |
| from GCR’s exploration of Copper Hill. Heron’s 3,500 km2 | |
| early stage exploration portfolio is in close proximity to | |
| GCR’s more advanced Copper Hill project. It is likely that | |
| any good results from GCR’s Copper Hill exploration will | |
| have a positive effect on Heron’s exploration portfolio, | |
| potentially increasing the value of its asset portfolio. On the | |
| other hand, if GCR’s Copper Hill results are poor, this will | |
| likely assist Heron with information as to whether (and how) | |
| to conduct similar exploration on its nearby exploration | |
| portfolio. Heron does not propose to compensate GCR for | |
| indirect benefits that it alone will enjoy if the Heron Proposal | |
| proceeds, nor is it likely that GCR would similarly benefit | |
| from Heron’s activities in its portfolio of exploration assets. | |
| Given Heron’s strong | It is unclear, given Heron’s performance to date, how the |
| balance sheet with $38.6 | involvement of Heron (both at the shareholder and board |
| million in cash and $5 | levels) would bring tangible benefits for GCR’s projects and |
| million in listed investments | how it would create value for GCR shareholders. |
| as at 30 September 2013, | |
| Heron has the capacity to | Heron has not yet successfully built and run a mining |
| provide financial support to | operation. Its operating results for the 2013 and 2012 |
| Golden Cross. | financial years were respectively losses of $10.48 million and |
| $5.36 million (equivalent to a loss of nearly $0.04 per share | |
| Page 3, 2nd item, last | in 2013 and a loss of approximately $0.023 per share in |
| paragraph | 2012). In addition, the share price of Heron has fallen by |
| approximately 25-30% since the beginning of 2013. | |
| Further, given that many of Heron’s projects are in close | |
| proximity to GCR’s assets, it is unclear how Heron would | |
| address potential conflicts of interest (if they arise) between | |
| GCR’s projects and Heron’s wholly owned assets. | |
| Heron approached Golden | The scrip-based merger between Heron and GCR proposed, |
| Cross in March 2013 on a | proposed by Heron in March 2013, was not supported by a |
page 3
| Heron’s assertion | Correction/clarification |
|---|---|
| non-binding, indicative and | majority of GCR directors, including directors independent of |
| confidential basis to | HQ. This determination was not made because any of those |
| consider a potential scrip- | directors were under HQ’s influence, as Heron asserts. |
| based merger between the | Rather, the directors considered that the commercial terms |
| companies. Feedback from | proposed by Heron would not be attractive to GCR |
| Golden Cross was that the | shareholders and were not in the best interests of GCR. HQ |
| board under HQ Mining’s | understands that Heron then was proposing approximately |
| influence was not | $2,000,000 for 50% of GCR or Copper Hill. |
| supportive, and follow-up | |
| preliminary soundings on | Like the current Heron Proposal, Heron’s 2013 proposals |
| potential farm-ins to Golden | were an attempt by it to obtain an influential stake in GCR |
| Cross projects failed to | and its assets without offering existing GCR shareholders |
| proceed. | with a price premium. |
| Page 4, 2nd item, 1st | |
| paragraph | |
| Despite being involved in | It is factually incorrect for Heron to state that in the 1 for 2 |
| the rights issue structuring | rights issue which took place in October 2013, HQ declined |
| through their board | to support GCR through taking up their rights, declined to |
| representation, HQ Mining | provide a public statement of support, and declined to |
| declined to support the | provide any form of underwriting to GCR. |
| Company through taking up | |
| their rights, declined to | HQ has always remained committed to GCR but was unable |
| provide a public statement | to participate in that rights issue due to matters beyond its |
| of support, and declined to | control. At the time, HQ sought an extension of the rights |
| provide any form of | issue timetable to permit it to participate, but an extension |
| underwriting to the | was not permitted under the ASX Listing Rules. HQ was |
| Company at that time. | therefore unable to participate. |
| Page 4, 3rd item, 2nd | |
| paragraph | |
| This lack of support by HQ | It is both incorrect and misleading to state that the scaling |
| Mining has seen Golden | back of GCR’s exploration activities was driven by a lack of |
| Cross’ previously | support by HQ. GCR has scaled back on exploration in order |
| aggressive and successful | to focus on the Copper Hill project and to transform itself |
| exploration scaled right | from a predominantly exploration company into a mining |
| back. | company. |
| Page 4, 4th item, 3rd | Further, HQ has always been supportive of GCR by giving its |
| paragraph | executives the autonomy to manage GCR’s day-to-day |
| operations. | |
| HQ Mining is now offering a | Contrary to Heron’s assertion, HQ has always been clear in |
| new rights issue of | its proposal to GCR, that it is proposing to take up its |
| uncertain size to issue | entitlement under, and underwrite, a pro-rata rights offer by |
| somewhere between 375.9 | GCR to issue 680,000,000 ordinary shares (or such lesser |
| million and 680 million | amount determined by GCR, but not less than 375,970,579 |
| shares… The uncertainty in | shares) at an issue price of $0.005 per share, which would |
| the potential outcomes of | raise up to $3,400,000 for GCR. |
| the Competing Offer do not | |
| allow Golden Cross | Rather than creating uncertainty for GCR shareholders, the |
page 4
| Heron’s assertion | Correction/clarification |
|---|---|
| shareholders to fully | structure of the HQ Proposal provides GCR with the flexibility |
| quantify their expenditure | to choose the amount that it wishes to raise, based on |
| exposure, level of dilution, | GCR’s business needs and capital requirements, whilst |
| or even to understand HQ | avoiding the dilution effect on all existing GCR shareholders |
| Mining’s work program | inherent in the Heron Proposal. GCR shareholders are in |
| priorities. | turn given the flexibility to choose whether or not to |
| subscribe for their rights (or oversubscribe, if they wish), | |
| Page 5, 1st item, 1st | secure in the knowledge that even if they do not outlay any |
| paragraph | money, GCR will obtain all the capital that it requires. |
| HQ Mining’s Competing | This ignores the fact that under the HQ Proposal, GCR |
| Proposal is likely to result in | shareholders can take up further shares (in addition to their |
| effective control of Golden | rights entitlement) proportionate to their current holdings in |
| Cross passing to HQ | GCR and, if they wish, to effectively co-underwrite the rights |
| Mining without a premium | offer with HQ. This is a significant mitigant to any potential |
| being paid | control effect of the proposal and allows GCR shareholders |
| to avoid being diluted by the HQ Proposal. | |
| Page 5, 2nd item | |
| By contrast, under the Heron Proposal, all GCR | |
| shareholders will be diluted by the 19.9% placement to | |
| Heron, and GCR shareholders will not receive any direct or | |
| indirect compensation for this dilution. | |
| There are likely regulatory | There is no basis to assert that there would likely be |
| impediments to HQ Mining | “regulatory impediments” to the HQ Proposal – no |
| underwriting any proposed | shareholder approvals are required for the proposal to |
| rights issue. | proceed. Equally, there is no basis to assert that there would |
| be a “significant delay of receipt of funds” associated with the | |
| HQ Mining’s Competing | HQ Proposal. |
| Proposal will significantly | |
| delay receipt of funds by | |
| Golden Cross, and may | |
| well require a further | |
| shareholder vote to | |
| approve. | |
| Page 5, 3rd & 4th items | |
| HQ Mining only provided an | Heron’s statement has no basis in fact. Heron first made its |
| alternative to Heron’s offer | proposal to GCR in November 2013, when no other proposal |
| when it became clear that it | existed. Having had its proposal rejected by the GCR board, |
| would otherwise lose | it then adopted “bear hug” tactics in its letter of 16 December |
| influence within the | 2013, in an attempt to coerce the GCR board into |
| Company. | capitulating to its demands. For reasons including various |
| deficiencies in the Heron Proposal, HQ formed the view that | |
| Page 6, 1st item, 1st | the Heron Proposal was not in the interests of GCR and |
| paragraph | subsequently provided its own proposal to better satisfy |
| GCR’s capital requirements on terms more favourable to all | |
| shareholders. | |
| Shareholders will also note that HQ’s proposal is dated 23 | |
| December 2013, while Heron’s proposal was provided on 8 | |
| January 2014 – see the annexures to the notice of meeting |
page 5
| Heron’s assertion | Correction/clarification |
|---|---|
| for the EGM. | |
| Following the withdrawal of | Since GCR’s 2012 Annual General Meeting, the GCR board |
| the re-election resolution | has engaged in the search for new directors with appropriate |
| for founding and | expertise and experience. However, the GCR board |
| outstanding Golden Cross | (including directors not connected with HQ) decided that in |
| director Mr David Timms | the best interests of GCR, the appointment of a further |
| immediately prior to the | director would be postponed, given GCR’s plans at the time |
| 2012 Annual General | for a rights issue and its expansion of the Copper Hill project. |
| Meeting, Golden Cross has | |
| failed to appoint a | |
| replacement, with the | |
| consequence being that | |
| HQ Mining’s influence on | |
| the board has increased. | |
| Page 6, 2nd item, 1st | |
| paragraph | |
| As a result, given her | HQ refutes this assertion. Ms Qian was first elected as a |
| presence on the board is | director at the annual general meeting on 29 November 2010 |
| now at the behest of HQ | by GCR shareholders other than HQ, due to the skills and |
| Mining, Heron considers | expertise that she brought to the board. Ms Qian is not a |
| that Ms Qian’s | director of HQ, is not a shareholder or employee of HQ, nor |
| independence may now | does any other basis exist for her independence to be called |
| have been compromised. | into question. |
| Page 6, 2nd item, 2nd &3rd | HQ has historically supported the re-election of Ms Qian, Mr |
| paragraphs | Steve Gemell and Mr Kim Stanton-Cook as directors. If |
| Heron’s assertion is correct, then Mr Gemell’s and Mr | |
| Stanton-Cook’s independence might, like Ms Qian’s, have | |
| been compromised too. | |
| In the view of Heron, proper | Heron’s opinion has no legal or other basis. Proper corporate |
| corporate governance | governance and the law requires that all directors (including |
| should require the HQ | HQ’s nominee directors) vote in the best interests of the |
| Mining nominees on the | company as a whole, as the HQ nominee directors have |
| Golden Cross board to | done. None of the GCR directors (including the HQ nominee |
| conflict themselves out of | directors) have a “material personal interest” in either |
| voting on the Heron Offer. | proposal, such that would require them to exclude |
| themselves from deliberation and voting. | |
| Page 6, 3rd item, 3rd | |
| paragraph | What would constitute improper corporate governance would |
| be for any of the directors to shy away from protecting the | |
| interests of all GCR shareholders simply because a | |
| proponent of a transaction seeks to apply pressure to them | |
| by making unsupportable assertions like those made by | |
| Heron. | |
| The HQ nominee directors determined that the Heron | |
| Proposal was not in the best interests of GCR and voted | |
| against it. This is what the law demands of them. |
page 6
Shareholders will be asked to consider two capital raising proposals available to GCR and to vote at the EGM on each of the Heron Proposal and, only if the Heron Proposal is not approved, the HQ Proposal. The two proposals are set out in the annexures to the notice of meeting for the EGM. HQ urges shareholders to vote in favour of the HQ Proposal for the following reasons:
Reasons to VOTE IN FAVOUR of the HQ Proposal include
| The HQ Proposal | The HQ Proposal would raise up to $3,400,000 for GCR. |
|---|---|
| provides significant | GCR would have the flexibility to choose the amount that it |
| additional funding and | wishes to raise, based on its capital requirements. The |
| flexibility as to the | Heron Proposal would not raise sufficient funds to fully meet |
| amount of capital to be | GCR’s business needs, whereas the HQ Proposal would |
| raised | provide GCR with significant additional funding (with the sum |
| being chosen by GCR) to enable it to progress its major | |
| projects for the benefit of all shareholders. | |
| The HQ Proposal is less | The HQ Proposal is subject to far fewer conditions than the |
| conditional and therefore | Heron Proposal (many of which limit GCR’s operational |
| more likely to proceed | flexibility or are outside GCR’s control – for example, the |
| conditions relating to a “material adverse change”). The HQ | |
| Proposal therefore provides GCR with greater certainty that | |
| it will be successfully capitalised, while maximising GCR’s | |
| operational flexibility while the capitalisation is being | |
| implemented. | |
| The HQ Proposal avoids | The HQ Proposal contemplates a rights offer, which will |
| dilution of existing | provide all existing shareholders an opportunity to take up |
| shareholders | further shares in GCR proportionate to their current holdings. |
| In addition, if they wish, all existing shareholders will be able | |
| to effectively co-underwrite the rights offer on a pro-rata | |
| basis. This structure provides existing shareholders with the | |
| maximum opportunity to avoid dilution of their existing | |
| interest in GCR. On the other hand, the Heron Proposal will | |
| result in the sale of a 19.9% stake in GCR to an external | |
| party, resulting in all existing shareholders having their | |
| interest in GCR materially diluted at no premium to the | |
| market price of GCR shares as at the date of the Heron | |
| Proposal. | |
| The HQ Proposal | HQ and its associated entities have been long term strategic |
| continues the | supporters of GCR. The HQ Proposal will continue the |
| commitment of GCR’s | alignment of the interests of GCR, HQ and other |
| long term strategic | shareholders, and will allow HQ and its associated entities to |
| supporter | continue to contribute their technical and industry expertise |
| for the benefit of GCR’s projects and development. | |
| It is unclear how Heron’s | The Heron Proposal contains no clear indication of the form, |
| placement creates value | timing or extent to which Heron will assist with progressing |
| or how conflicts of | the exploration and development of Copper Hill. In fact, there |
| interest would be | is no certainty that the involvement of Heron (at either the |
| managed | shareholder or board levels of GCR) would bring tangible |
| benefits for GCR’s projects or create value for the existing | |
| shareholders. Furthermore, Heron has not made any |
page 7
indication of how it would deal with conflicts of interest that may well arise for it or the director that it places on the GCR board, arising from the proximity between the two companies’ projects and their operation in the same market.
The HQ Proposal does not require changes to existing strategy or operations
The HQ Proposal does not require changes to GCR’s board nor does it contain any limitations on how GCR deploys the funds raised. On the other hand, the Heron Proposal will not proceed unless GCR’s board composition is changed, potentially affecting the ability of GCR to continue with its existing plans and strategies.
Heron’s placement deprives existing shareholders of a premium
The Heron Proposal contemplates the issue of a strategic 19.9% stake in GCR to an external party for zero premium to the market price of GCR’s shares as at the date the Heron Proposal was announced (and a significant preceding period). Allotment of a new strategic stake in GCR should command a significant premium to market price, reflecting the benefits and influence it carries, including the right to unilaterally block future transactions that would otherwise deliver value to existing shareholders.
For all the reasons set out above, HQ again urges all GCR shareholders to:
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VOTE AGAINST the Heron Proposal; and
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VOTE IN FAVOUR of the HQ Proposal,
at the extraordinary general meeting on Thursday 27 February 2014.
It is important that shareholders VOTE AGAINST the Heron Proposal at the EGM, because if the Heron Proposal is passed, the chairman will not be putting the HQ Proposal to the EGM.
Kind regards
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Yan Li
Managing Director of HQ Mining Resources Holding Pty Ltd
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