Enel

Remuneration Information • Apr 19, 2018

INFORMATION DOCUMENT

Pursuant to article 84-bis, paragraph 1, of the Regulation adopted by Consob with Resolution No. 11971 dated May 14, 1999, as subsequently amended and supplemented,

related to the

LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN 2018

OF

ENEL S.P.A.

GLOSSARY .............................................................................................................................................. 4 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 6

1. BENEFICIARIES .................................................................................................................................. 6

1.1 Indication by name of the Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan who are members of the Board of Directors of Enel .................................................................................................................................... 6

1.2 Indication of the categories of employees or collaborators of Enel and of the Group which are Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan................................................................................................................... 6

1.3 Indication by name of the Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan who are general managers or executives with strategic responsibilities (in case they have received during the financial year a total compensation exceeding the highest compensation granted to the members of the Board of Directors) 7

	1.4 Description and numerical indication of the Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan who are executives with strategic responsibilities and any other possible categories of employees or collaborators for whom diverse characteristics of the plan apply
	2. REASONS SUPPORTING THE ADOPTION OF THE PLAN
2.1	Objectives to be achieved through the Plan
2.2	Key variables and performance indicators considered for purposes of awarding incentives under the Plan
2.3	Criteria for determining the amount to be awarded
2.4	Reasons underlying the possible decision to award compensation plans based upon financial instruments not issued by Enel
2.5	Material tax and accounting implications
2.6	Support, if any, for the Plan from the Special Fund aimed at incentivizing workers' shareholdings in companies ("Fondo speciale per l'incentivazione della partecipazione dei lavoratori nelle imprese"), pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 112, of Law No. 350 dated December 24, 2003
	3. APPROVAL PROCESS AND TIMEFRAME FOR THE AWARD OF THE LTI PLAN
3.1	Powers and functions delegated by the Shareholders' Meeting to the Board of Directors for the implementation of the LTI Plan
3.2	Subjects in charge for managing the Plan
3.3	Existing Procedures for reviewing the Plan
3.4	Procedures for determining the availability and award of financial instruments10
3.5	Role played by each Director in determining the Plan's characteristics
3.6	Date of the decision made by the competent body to propose the Plan to the Shareholders' Meeting approval and of the proposal, if any, by the Nomination and Compensation Committee 10
3.7	Date of the decision made by the competent body on the award of financial instruments and of the proposal, if any, submitted by the Nomination and Compensation Committee 10
3.8	Market price registered on the above-mentioned dates, for the financial instruments on which the Plan is based

3.9 Safeguards adopted by the Company with regard to the possibility that the date of the award of the financial instruments or the date of possible decisions in such regard by the Nomination and Compensation Committee may coincide with the date of dissemination of material information within the meaning set forth under Article 17 of the EU Regulation No. 596/2014. ......................................... 11

4.	CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LTI PLAN 11
4.1	Structure of the Plan 11
4.2	Period of implementation of the Plan 11
4.3	Expiry of the Plan 12
4.4	Maximum number of financial instruments awarded in each financial year to the persons identified by name or to the categories indicated 12
4.5	Methods of implementing the Plan and related provisions 12
4.6	Availability restrictions imposed upon the financial instruments awarded 15
4.7	Conditions subsequent, if any, in connection with the Plan in the event that the Beneficiaries were to conclude hedging transactions that allow for the neutralization of any selling restrictions applicable to the financial instruments 15
4.8	Effects caused by the termination of the employment relationship 15
4.9	Indications of any other causes for the cancellation of the Plan 15
4.10	Reasons underlying the possible redemption of financial instruments granted under the Plan 15
4.11	Loans or other assistance, if any, for the purchase of the financial instruments 15
4.12	Estimated expected cost for Enel as of the date of the award 15
4.13	Dilution effects, if any, caused by the Plan 15
4.14 -	4.23 16

GLOSSARY

Where used in this information document, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth below.

Nomination and Compensation Committee	The Committee of Enel, currently comprised exclusively of Independent Directors, having, inter alia, consultative and proposing functions in connection with the remuneration of Directors and Executives with Strategic Responsibilities.
Beneficiaries	The managers of Enel and/or of companies controlled by Enel pursuant to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code who are beneficiaries of the Plan.
Executives with Strategic Responsibilities	The executives that report directly to the Chief Executive Officer of Enel who (depending upon the composition, frequency of meetings and matters discussed within the management committees involving the top management) effectively make, together with the Chief Executive Officer, the decisions that are considered key for the Group.
Information Document	This document drawn pursuant to and for purposes of Article 84- bis, paragraph 1, of the Issuers' Regulation.
Enel or the Company	Enel S.p.A.
Group	Enel and its controlled companies pursuant to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code.
EUROSTOXX Utilities Index – EMU (Euro Area/Economic and Monetary Union)	The Index managed by STOXX Ltd. and including the most relevant utilities companies listed in Euro Area countries (EMU). As of the date of the present document, such index includes A2A, E.On, EDF, EDP, Enagas, Endesa, Enel, Engie, Fortum, Gas Natural, Iberdrola, Innogy, Italgas, Red Electrica, Rubis, Rwe, Snam Rete Gas, Suez Environnement, Terna, Uniper and Veolia Environnement.
LTI Plan	The Long-Term Incentive Plan adopted by the Company for year 2018.
Issuers' Regulation	The Regulation adopted by Consob with Resolution No. 11971 dated May 14, 1999, as subsequently amended and supplemented.
Return on Average Capital Employed (ROACE)	Ratio between Ordinary EBIT (Ordinary Operating Results) and average net invested capital.
Total Shareholders Return (TSR)	Index that measures the total return on a share, by taking the sum of the following components:
	(i) capital gain: ratio between the change in the market price of the share (difference between the price determined at the end and at the beginning of the relevant period) and the market price determined at the beginning of the period itself;
	(ii) dividends reinvested: impact of all dividends paid and reinvested in the share as of the ex-dividend date.

Consolidated Financial Act Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998.

INTRODUCTION

The Information Document, drawn in accordance with Article 84-bis, paragraph 1, of the Issuers' Regulation, is published in order to provide the Company's shareholders and the market with an extensive and detailed information on the proposal to adopt the LTI Plan.

The LTI Plan, while not providing for the award of financial instruments in favor of the Beneficiaries, does envisage the possible disbursement to them of a monetary incentive that varies, inter alia, on the basis of the level of achievement of the Total Shareholders' Return, measured with reference to the trend in the Enel share over the reference three years (2018- 2020) as compared with that of the EUROSTOXX Utilities Index – EMU.

Due to these characteristics, the LTI Plan may be qualified as a "compensation plan based upon financial instruments" pursuant to Article 114-bis, paragraph 1, of the Consolidated Financial Act and, as such, it is subject to the approval of the ordinary Shareholders' Meeting to be held on May 24, 2018 on a single call.

The Information Document is available to the public at Enel's registered office (in Rome, Viale Regina Margherita No. 137), as well as on the Company's website (www.enel.com) and on the mechanism for the central storage "eMarket Storage" ().

1. BENEFICIARIES

1.1 Indication by name of the Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan who are members of the Board of Directors of Enel

The LTI Plan includes among its Beneficiaries the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager, Francesco Starace.

1.2 Indication of the categories of employees or collaborators of Enel and of the Group which are Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan

Approximately 250 managers of the Company and/or companies controlled by Enel pursuant to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code, including the General Manager (who is also the Chief Executive Officer) of Enel, who hold positions that are most directly responsible for the company's results or who are of strategic interest, are the Beneficiaries of the Plan. Among such managers are also included those belonging to the Business Line "Global Infrastructure and Networks", as well as to the "Iberia", "South America" and "Europe and North Africa" Regions in favor of some of which are established specific objectives linked to the relevant activities of the abovementioned Business Lines and Regions, taking into consideration the requirement to carry on the business on an autonomous basis and the compliance with the unbundling laws in force.

It should be noted that some of the managers who are Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan are currently members of the boards of directors of companies controlled by Enel pursuant to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code. Such executives are not indicated by name as described in paragraph 1.1 above since the award under the Plan does not depend on the offices held by them in the above-mentioned companies, since such award is determined solely on the basis of their managerial role within the Group.

1.3 Indication by name of the Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan who are general managers or executives with strategic responsibilities (in case they have received during the financial year a total compensation exceeding the highest compensation granted to the members of the Board of Directors)

The LTI Plan includes among its Beneficiaries the General Manager (who is also Chief Executive Officer) of Enel, Francesco Starace.

1.4 Description and numerical indication of the Beneficiaries of the LTI Plan who are executives with strategic responsibilities and any other possible categories of employees or collaborators for whom diverse characteristics of the plan apply

In addition to the paragraph 1.2 above, the LTI Plan includes among its Beneficiaries the managers who are currently "executives with strategic responsibilities" as defined under article 65, paragraph 1-quater, of the Issuers' Regulation. Reference is made to the heads of:

• the "Administration, Finance and Control" and "Human Resources and Organization" Holding Functions, as well as of the "Global Procurement" Function which pertains to the Global Service Functions;
• the Global Business Lines "Global Thermal Generation", "Global Infrastructure and Networks", "Global Trading", "Global Renewable Energies" and "Enel X";
• the "Italy", "Iberia", "South America" and "Europe and North Africa" Country and Region,

for a total of 12 executive positions.

It should be noted that the incentive scheme envisaged under the LTI Plan is the same for all Beneficiaries, and only differentiates on the basis of the percentage of the incentive granted and of the performance scale for each objective. In particular, the assigned incentive percentage rises on the basis of the role held by the Beneficiaries and the responsibilities assigned to them. In relation to the performance scale, the LTI Plan provides that, when the second over-performance threshold of each target is reached, it should be granted (i) to the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager a premium equivalent to 280% of the base amount; (ii) to the other Beneficiaries, a premium equivalent to 180% of the base amount assigned to each of them.

2. REASONS SUPPORTING THE ADOPTION OF THE PLAN

2.1 Objectives to be achieved through the Plan

The Plan is aimed at:

• aligning the interests of the Beneficiaries of the Plan with the pursuit of the priority goal consisting in the creation of value for shareholders over the medium/longterm;

• encouraging the management's commitment to achieving common objectives at the Group level, while in the meantime promoting the coordination and integration of the activities of the various companies belonging to the Group;

• promoting the loyalty of the Beneficiaries of the Plan, and in particular promoting the retention of those who hold "key" positions within the Group;

• safeguarding the Company's competitiveness on the labor market.

2.2 Key variables and performance indicators considered for purposes of awarding incentives under the Plan

The Plan envisages the disbursement of a monetary incentive, the amount of which may vary depending upon the level of achievement of three-year performance objectives, from 0 (and therefore if none of the objectives is achieved, no incentive is awarded) up to a maximum of 280% or 180% of the base amount, respectively for the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager or for the other Beneficiaries. The following table indicates the performance objectives upon which the disbursement of incentives under the LTI Plan are conditioned, as well as the related weight:

Performance objective	Weight
Average TSR of Enel vs average TSR of the EUROSTOXX Utilities Index – EMU 2018-2020	50%
Cumulative ROACE over the three years 2018-2020	40%
CO2 grams emissions per equivalent KWh produced by the Group in 2020( 1 )	10%

The choice to condition the LTI Plan upon the prior achievement of specific performance objectives aims at fully aligning the Beneficiaries' interests with those of the shareholders. In addition, such objectives, which apply in an identical manner to all Beneficiaries of the Plan, have a three-year timeline in order to encourage the consolidation of results and the enhancement of the intended long-term characteristics of the Plan.

For further information on the performance objectives upon which the exercise of the incentive right under the LTI Plan is conditioned, see paragraph 4.5 below.

2.3 Criteria for determining the amount to be awarded

The amount to be awarded to each Beneficiary of the Plan will be determined by taking as a reference a percentage of the fixed remuneration; this percentage is identified on the basis of each Beneficiary's category. For this purpose, the Beneficiaries of the Plan are divided into 4 categories, which provide for the disbursement of a base monetary incentive ranging between 30% and 100% of fixed remuneration (in the event of achievement of the target level referred to in paragraph 4.5 below), in line with the principles of the remuneration policy of Enel. The latter provide that:

• there must be an adequate balance between the fixed component and the variable component and, within the latter, between the short-term and the longterm variable components;
• the fixed component must be sufficient to remunerate the work done by the person involved (taking into account the responsibilities assigned to the latter) in the event that the variable component was not disbursed due to the failure to achieve the performance objectives;
• the incentive percentage must rise on the basis of the role held and the responsibilities assigned.

( 1 ) Emissions from the Group's plants' production.

In particular, it should be noted that the monetary incentive disbursable to the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager may amount to 100% of the fixed remuneration in the event that the target level is achieved, or to 280% of such remuneration in the event that the maximum level of over-performance is achieved.

If the performance objectives are not achieved, no monetary incentive under the LTI Plan will be disbursed.

2.4 Reasons underlying the possible decision to award compensation plans based upon financial instruments not issued by Enel

Not applicable.

2.5 Material tax and accounting implications

The sums paid in connection with the Plan are taken into account to a normal extent in determining the taxable income of recipients and are subject to the ordinary social security regime applicable to compensation paid in cash.

2.6 Support, if any, for the Plan from the Special Fund aimed at incentivizing workers' shareholdings in companies ("Fondo speciale per l'incentivazione della partecipazione dei lavoratori nelle imprese"), pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 112, of Law No. 350 dated December 24, 2003

Not applicable.

3. APPROVAL PROCESS AND TIMEFRAME FOR THE AWARD OF THE LTI PLAN

3.1 Powers and functions delegated by the Shareholders' Meeting to the Board of Directors for the implementation of the LTI Plan

During the ordinary Shareholders' Meeting of Enel called to resolve upon the LTI Plan, it will be proposed to grant to the Board of Directors, with the faculty to sub-delegate, the broadest powers necessary to effectively implement the same Plan, to be exercised in accordance with the principles established by the present Information Document, as provided under the explanatory report drawn by the Board of Directors in accordance with article 125-ter of the Consolidated Financial Act, made available to the public at the registered office of Enel (in Rome, Viale Regina Margherita No. 137), on the Company's website at www.enel.com and on the authorized storage mechanism called "eMarket Storage" ().

3.2 Subjects in charge for managing the Plan

The corporate body responsible for decisions related to the LTI Plan – without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Shareholders' Meeting – is the Company's Board of Directors, which oversees the day-to-day management of the Plan, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant implementation rules.

From a strictly operating standpoint, the Plan is managed by the "Human Resources and Organization" Function.

3.3 Existing Procedures for reviewing the Plan

No procedures exist for reviewing the LTI Plan, without prejudice for the Nomination and Compensation Committee to propose to the Board of Directors possible changes to the level of achievement of the performance objectives in the event of material changes in the Group's perimeter or in the relevant accounting standards to be used in the calculation of the ROACE objective. It is agreed that the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager, since he is a Beneficiary of the Plan, will not take part in any board discussions and resolutions concerning this matter.

3.4 Procedures for determining the availability and award of financial instruments

The LTI Plan does not provide for the award of financial instruments.

3.5 Role played by each Director in determining the Plan's characteristics

The entire process of defining the LTI Plan's characteristics was carried out on a jointly basis and with the proposing and consultative support of the Nomination and Compensation Committee, in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the Corporate Governance Code and the best corporate governance practices in this area. It should also be noted that the resolution through which the Board of Directors adopted the scheme of the LTI Plan to be submitted to the Shareholders' Meeting for approval was unanimously approved; the Chief Executive Officer, since he is one of the Beneficiaries of the Plan, did not take part in the discussion and resolution on the Plan itself.

3.6 Date of the decision made by the competent body to propose the Plan to the Shareholders' Meeting approval and of the proposal, if any, by the Nomination and Compensation Committee

The decision of the Board of Directors to submit the LTI Plan to the Shareholders' Meeting for approval is dated April 18, 2018, upon prior approval of the scheme of the same Plan on the same date. The proposal of the Nomination and Compensation Committee on the scheme of the LTI Plan is dated December 13, 2017, with regard to its structure, and February 13, 2018 with regard to the incentive curves.

3.7 Date of the decision made by the competent body on the award of financial instruments and of the proposal, if any, submitted by the Nomination and Compensation Committee

Not applicable.

3.8 Market price registered on the above-mentioned dates, for the financial instruments on which the Plan is based

Set forth below is the market price of the Company's shares registered on the dates indicated in paragraph 3.6 above:

• reference price of the Enel share registered on the Mercato Telematico Azionario organized and managed by Borsa Italiana S.p.A. on December 13, 2017: Euro 5.43;
• reference price of the Enel share registered on the Mercato Telematico Azionario organized and managed by Borsa Italiana S.p.A. on February 13, 2018: Euro 4.65.
• reference price of the Enel share registered on the Mercato Telematico Azionario organized and managed by Borsa Italiana S.p.A. on April 18, 2018: Euro 5.19.

3.9 Safeguards adopted by the Company with regard to the possibility that the date of the award of the financial instruments or the date of possible decisions in such regard by the Nomination and Compensation Committee may coincide with the date of dissemination of material information within the meaning set forth under Article 17 of the EU Regulation No. 596/2014.

Not applicable.

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LTI PLAN

4.1 Structure of the Plan

The LTI Plan consists of the award of a monetary incentive that may vary, depending upon the level of achievement of three-year performance objectives upon which the Plan is conditioned (see paragraph 4.5 below), from 0 (and therefore in the event that none of the objectives is achieved, no incentive would be awarded) up to 280% or to 180% of the base value respectively for the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager or for the other Beneficiaries.

4.2 Period of implementation of the Plan

The exercise of the LTI Plan is conditioned upon the achievement of specific performance objectives over three-year period 2018-2020 (the "performance period", coinciding with the "vesting period"). If such objectives are achieved, the Plan may be exercised with respect to 30% in 2021 and, with respect to the remaining 70%, in the following year. In fact, the disbursement of a significant portion of the long-term remuneration (equal to 70% of the total) is deferred to the second financial year after the relevant three-years period of the LTI Plan ("deferred payment").

Chronology of the LTI Plan

(*) In the event that the performance objectives are achieved.

4.3 Expiry of the Plan

The LTI Plan will expire in 2022.

4.4 Maximum number of financial instruments awarded in each financial year to the persons identified by name or to the categories indicated

Not applicable.

4.5 Methods of implementing the Plan and related provisions

The exercise of the LTI Plan is conditioned upon the achievement of the following performance objectives:

Performance objective	Weight
Average TSR( 2 ) of Enel vs average TSR of the EUROSTOXX Utilities Index – EMU in the period 2018-2020	50%
3 Cumulative ROACE for the three years 2018-2020 ( )	40%
CO2 grams emissions per equivalent KWh produced by the Group in 2020( 4 )	10%

The objective related to TSR will be measured on the basis of the performance scale set forth below (with a linear interpolation between the different thresholds). If the performance does not reach the pre-established minimum threshold, no bonus will be awarded.

Enel's TSR exceeding 115% of the Index's TSR	Enel's TSR between 110% and 115% of the Index's TSR	Enel's TSR between 100% and 110% of the Index's TSR	Enel's TSR between 90% and 100% of the Index's TSR	Enel's TSR lower than 90% of the Index's TSR
5 280%/180%( )	150%	100%	50%	0%

In case the absolute TSR of Enel share in the relevant three-years period is negative, the incentive due to the management (if any) is reduced – on the basis of a regressive scale – of the same negative percentage of the absolute TSR of Enel share, multiplied for a constant value equal to 1.5.

( 2 ) The average Total Shareholders Return (TSR) of Enel and of the EUROSTOXX Utilities Index – EMU is calculated as average value of the TSR in the one-month period preceding the start date and the end date of the performance period (January 1, 2018 – December 31, 2020), in order to sterilize any volatility that may be present on the market.

⁽ 3 ) The ROACE is calculated as the ratio between Ordinary EBIT (Ordinary Operating Results) and average NIC (Net Invested Capital), the latter being determined as the average between the figures at the beginning and at the end of the relevant year. The Ordinary EBIT does not include the items which cannot be referred to the ordinary business, including the asset write-downs due to impairment considered as extraordinary for the purpose of determining the Group ordinary net income. For the final assessment, the (positive and negative) impacts arising from the exchange rate differential compared to the assumptions of the Business Plan will be sterilized. Moreover, the final assessment shall be made taking into account the impacts of the new international accounting standards in force starting from January 1, 2018.

The NIC does not include the Discontinued Operations and the effect of the asset write-downs due to impairment, that has been sterilized for determining the Ordinary EBIT's value as specified above. Moreover, the final assessment shall be made taking into account the impacts of the new international accounting standards in force starting from January 1, 2018.

For the final assessment, the Nomination and Compensation Committee shall be provided with information on the extraordinary transactions that, based on the management's judgement, could have affected the value of the relevant KPI, in order to assess their possible sterilization.

⁽ 4 ) Emissions from the Group's plants' production.

⁽ 5 ) The LTI Plan provides that, when the second over-performance threshold of target is reached, it should be granted (i) to the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager a premium equivalent to 280% of the base amount; (ii) to the other Beneficiaries, a premium equivalent to 180% of the base amount assigned to them.

Please find here below a schedule which provides for certain simulations concerning the application of the aforementioned regressive scale, with specific reference to the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager.

Achieved targets	Incentive in case of Enel absolute TSR > 0%	Regressive scale multiplier	Incentive in case of Enel absolute TSR < 0%
			-5%	-10%	-15%	-20%
Enel TSR > 115% Index TSR	280%	1.5	259%	238%	217%	196%
Enel TSR between 110% and 115%	150%	1.5	139%	128%	116%	105%
Enel TSR between 100% and 110%	100%	1.5	93%	85%	78%	70%
Enel TSR between 90% and 100%	50%	1.5	46%	43%	39%	35%
Enel TSR < 90% Index	0 %	1.5	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %

Furthermore, please find here below a schedule which provides for the same simulations concerning the application of the aforementioned regressive scale with regard to the Beneficiaries other than the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager.

Achieved targets	Incentive in case of Enel absolute TSR > 0%	Regressive scale multiplier			Incentive in case of Enel absolute TSR < 0%
			-5%	-10%	-15%	-20%
Enel TSR > 115% Index TSR	180%	1.5	167%	153%	140%	126%
Enel TSR between 110% and 115%	150%	1.5	139%	128%	116%	105%
Enel TSR between 100% and 110%	100%	1.5	93%	85%	78%	70%
Enel TSR between 90% and 100%	50%	1.5	46%	43%	39%	35%
Enel TSR < 90% Index	0 %	1.5	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %

The objective linked to ROACE will be measured on the basis of the performance scale set forth below (with a linear interpolation between the different thresholds). If the performance does not reach the access threshold, no bonus will be awarded.

Objective	Access threshold	Target	Over I	Over II
Cumulative ROACE for three years 2018- 2020	36.4%	37.5%	38.0%	38.6%

The objective linked to CO² emissions will be measured on the basis of the performance scale set forth below (with a linear interpolation between the different thresholds). If the performance does not reach the access threshold, no bonus will be awarded.

Objective	Access threshold	Target	Over I	Over II
CO2 Emissions (gCO2/KWheq) of the Group in 2020	<=380	<=350	<=340	<=330

Upon the achievement of the access threshold or of the target, it is envisaged, respectively, that a sum equal to 50% or 100% of the base amount would be disbursed, while upon the achievement of the over-performance, a sum equal to (i) 150% (Over I) or (ii) 280% (for the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager) or 180% (for other Beneficiaries) of the base amount would be disbursed (Over II), as indicated here below:

Therefore if, for example:

• all the objectives (TSR, ROACE and CO² emissions) were to reach the target level, the remuneration disbursable in favor of the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager would amount to 100% of the fixed remuneration;
• the only objective achieved was the TSR, at a level equal to the access threshold, the remuneration disbursable in favor of the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager would be equal to 25% of the fixed remuneration.

The Company is entitled to claim-back the variable remuneration (both short-term and long-term) paid (or to withhold the variable remuneration subject to deferral), if it is found to have been disbursed or calculated on the basis of data which later turn out to be clearly erroneous (clawback and malus clause).

• 4.6 Availability restrictions imposed upon the financial instruments awarded Not applicable.
• 4.7 Conditions subsequent, if any, in connection with the Plan in the event that the Beneficiaries were to conclude hedging transactions that allow for the neutralization of any selling restrictions applicable to the financial instruments

Not applicable.

4.8 Effects caused by the termination of the employment relationship

In the event of termination of the directorship relationship or of termination of the openended or fixed-term employment relationship for voluntary resignation, without just cause, or revocation or dismissal for just cause or justified personal reason, the Beneficiary loses any right related to the LTI Plan.

In the event where, before the end of the performance period, the termination of the directorship relationship occurs for the expiry of the mandate, without the simultaneous renewal of the same, and/or a fixed term employment relationship should expire, the disbursement under the LTI Plan would take place at the natural expiry of the relevant vesting period, depending upon the level of achievement of the performance objectives envisaged under the Plan itself; in this case, however, the disbursement will be made pro rata temporis until the date of termination of the directorship or of the employment relationship.

4.9 Indications of any other causes for the cancellation of the Plan

No causes for cancellation of the Plan apply.

4.10 Reasons underlying the possible redemption of financial instruments granted under the Plan

Not applicable.

4.11 Loans or other assistance, if any, for the purchase of the financial instruments

Not applicable.

4.12 Estimated expected cost for Enel as of the date of the award

The total maximum economic cost of the LTI Plan (borne by Enel and its subsidiaries), estimated as of the date of this Information Document, amounts to approximately Euro 55 million.

4.13 Dilution effects, if any, caused by the Plan

Given that the LTI Plan provides for the award of a cash sum, its implementation does not have any dilution effects on Enel's share capital.

4.14 - 4.23

The paragraphs on the award of shares and stock options do not apply.